- IJN Sortie to Ceylon
-
- Posted By: Deniz Karaçay <mailto:denizkaracay@yahoo.com?subject=IJN Sotie to Ceylon>
Date: Friday, 1 June 2001, at 6:06 p.m.
-
- I did not quite get the idea what IJN was doing there. Was the sole purpose to sink British Ships or was there an invasion plan for Ceylon (todays Sri Lanka) or even Madagascar?
- Can you suggest any good books about this operation.
-
- Thanks
Deniz
-
- Re: IJN Sotie to Ceylon
-
- Posted By: Elliott <mailto:elliott1940@yahoo.com?subject=Re: IJN Sotie to Ceylon>
Date: Tuesday, 12 June 2001, at 10:29 a.m.
-
- In Response To: IJN Sotie to Ceylon
(Deniz Karaçay)
-
- For an excellent account of the Japanese attack on Ceylon, read 'Bloody Shambles' by Christopher Shores, I think vol. 2 - from memory, the Japanese never planned to invade Ceylon - they were just out to sink British (& allied) shipping.
- We lost a lot of Hurricanes in both attacks on Columbo and
Trincomalee.
- Regards,
- Elliott
-
- Thank you all
-
- Posted By: Deniz Karacay <mailto:dkaracay@umr.edu?subject=Thank you all>
Date: Wednesday, 6 June 2001, at 5:48 p.m.
-
- In Response To: IJN Sotie to Ceylon
(Deniz Karaçay)
-
- Well, I still did not get any Grand Strategy behind Ceylon Sortie, perhaps there was none. If the idea was to sink what was left of RN then it was more like using a Sledge Hammer to crack a nut and unnecessarily risk NO1 force of Japan. Kido Butai came so close to give Blenheim its finest hour.
-
- Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon
-
- Posted By: Randy
Date: Monday, 4 June 2001, at 8:43 p.m.
-
- In Response To: IJN Sotie to Ceylon
(Deniz Karaçay)
-
- Hi Deniz:
- I can't tell you why the Japanese went to Ceylon...what a major waste of time and effort. Just who did they think they were battling? and with USN carriers roaming the Outer Mandates during this time? and with the need to refit and refresh their ships and men of the Nagumo Force for Second Stage Operations? Beats the devil out of me what they thought they were doing, although they were rather successful at it.
- Don't get me wrong, the Japanese had sound and valid arguments for what they did but as a latter-day, Monday-morning observer of the events, Operation "C" just reeks to high heaven.
-
- More to the point, however, Nagumo was nearly bit, and bit hard, about three times during this operation and these examples should have provided a warning to the IJN in general and Nagumo in particular:
-
- 1.) The absence of decent search capabilities by the Kido Butai. Nagumo was definitely out on limb using limited scouting by accompanying surface vessels; no, while Tone and Chikuma (and later Mogami) were steps in the proper direction, the fact is that Nagumo's carriers had limited organic assets and training for reconnaissance. The Kido Butai was oriented far too much toward attack TO THE EXCLUSION OF adequate reconnaissance.
- 2.) The discovery of Cornwall and Dorsetshire was a definite surprise to Nagumo and, to some degree, so was Hermes. That the assets for assault against these vessels existed hid a fundamental flaw in Japanese carrier operations. Namely, an unknown force could catch Nagumo with his pants down while the majority of his strike force was committed either to an attack or to rearming...sound familiar?
- 3.) The British nevertheless nearly nailed Nagumo with night flying torpedo bombers (hadn't heard that one before? neither had I until Mark Horan gratiously enlightened me about this) and Nagumo was most lucky when the Blenheims surprised and bombed his force like 'a bolt from the blue'...again, sound familiar?
-
- As to sources regarding Operation "C," off the top of my pointed head I would say:
- David Thomas...Japan's War at Sea,
- H.P. Willmott...Empires in the Balance,
- Fuchida and Okumiya...Midway!,
- Gray...Operation Pacific.
-
- And I would particularly recommend Thomas given his coverage of the Ryujo/heavy cruiser raids during the Nagumo attacks...something usually overlooked by most histories.
-
- Sincerely,
- Randy
-
- Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon
-
- Posted By: Deniz Karacay <mailto:denizkaracay@yahoo.com?subject=Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon>
Date: Thursday, 7 June 2001, at 7:31 p.m.
-
- In Response To: Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon (Randy)
-
- What kind of a/c attacked Japanese Carriers at night? Swordfish? Beaufort?
Blenheim?
-
- Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon
-
- Posted By: Randy
Date: Friday, 8 June 2001, at 12:45 a.m.
-
- In Response To: Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon
(Deniz Karacay)
-
- IIRC, it was radar equipped Albacores which were to do the night dirty work against
Nagumo.
- The Blenheims hit him during daylight.
-
- Randy
-
- Re: Attack on KdB
-
- Posted By: Allan <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: Attack on KdB>
Date: Friday, 8 June 2001, at 11:55 a.m.
-
- In Response To: (Deniz
Karacay)
-
- Deniz,
- Not quite........ They used level bombing at 11,000 ft. Of the 11 that took off, 2 aborted, and 3 surviving machines were so shot up, they were written off. 6 were lost along with the crews. It was a fore-taste of events to come......
- And it should be noted, that the Blenheims came in under the IJN CAP, and weren't spotted so they did have an element of surprise, but it was all for naught.
-
- Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon
-
- Posted By: Allan <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon>
Date: Tuesday, 5 June 2001, at 9:29 p.m.
-
- In Response To: Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon (Randy)
-
- Hello Randy,
- Nagumo was merely following the instructions handed down to him, and that was to keep the Royal Navy away from the Burma operations and not to make the same mistake (Oil Tanks and Docks) he made at Pearl Harbor.
-
- The conjecture is the search that was conducted by Nagumo. I've heard many variations of why he used a single phased search, but I've not seen anything documented. I have not heard any evidence as to what type of aircraft were involved in those searches, just rumors. Personally, I believe he used those from his cruisers, using a 180 degree fan. That might use at least 10 aircraft, I don't know.
- The other conjecture was why an interdiction while the US was roaming thru the Mandates? "C" Operation was already on the table a month before it took place and it actually started with the Andaman Operation, or the beginning of it. I don't know nor have I heard (Documented) what Yamamoto's thoughts were on the subject, but I've heard unsubstaniated comments on it. Since I don't have any recorded documents on the subject, I refrain from making any statements, as it could prove false. But the fact is, Nagumo was following orders, and he did use a single phased search which could have caught him, or maybe not, and that depends who one talks to. My purpose was to clear the air and not read more into it or take something out of it.
- Nagumo has taken some lumps, but if one looks at what his assignment was, he did follow it to the letter. It is most fortunate that Yamamoto selected Nagumo to run KdB, for if it had been Yamaguchi, the war might have lasted a while longer.
-
- FWIW - Al
-
- Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon
-
- Posted By: Randy
Date: Wednesday, 6 June 2001, at 5:17 p.m.
-
- In Response To: Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon (Allan)
-
- Hi Allan:
- OK, I just wanted to see precisely where you were coming from and why.
- As to conjecture over these issues I would not shy away from such concerning the IJN in general or Operation 'C' in particular. But your caution is not to be dismissed nor do I do so.
-
- But let me begin a few comments by saying I feel a great deal of sympathy towards Nagumo as opposed to the great deal of opprobrium he has garnered over the years. As to whether there was more latitude to be exercised by the Kido Butai, and was apparent to Nagumo and his staff and not judiciously considered, I too am not certain. This is why -- for better or worse -- I am trying to secure the writings of various of the wartime commanders for what it is worth, ie. Kusaka, Ugaki, etc. Nevertheless, there is not a whole lot to be lost by engaging in reasonable conjecture assuming we try to ascertain truth rather than fiction; and, as long as the agenda we pursue is grounded in neutrality with respect to the facts as we can determine them.
-
- I understand your comments regarding the timetables set out by the Japanese and how these contributed to the operations which ensued. My comments were directed at the fundamental core of the issue; namely, why the Japanese chose to dilute their efforts against the USN by moving into the Indian Ocean. I understand your viewpoint and respect that. I do not believe you have failed to provide any answers and are correct in assuming a stance of caution lest we provoke a great deal of misinformation. I believe the information we seek does exist.
-
- My information about the search plans is scant but parallels yours and I believe we are close to the facts. I am also interested in why this type of search plan was allowed to continue…leaving aside hubris, habit and Japanese psyche. It has been many years since I have read cover to cover either of Willmott's volumes (and I believe both are very good, where is the third?) but I intend to do so and have them readily at hand. And, in spite of the fact that Willmott's version of Midway will be revised somewhat and shortly, I find his analyses quite provoking and valid, if somewhat ill-served by some of his sources (primarily Morison).
- I could stand on my points 1, 2 and 3 above simply by pointing out that they indeed are true but, like you I presume, I am very interested in the how and why of it all. However, I would rather say that I am pleased by your approach to the issue and thank you for the courtesy of a thoughtful reply rather than the type of invective and polemics I could find on other forums.
-
- Could you possibly post relevant sources regarding Operation "C" and reconnaissance procedures of which you are aware and which I may find of use?
- Lastly, allow me to apologise for this post sounding so pedantic. I am almost embarrassed by its' style but feel the need to get the message out as more important than any necessary editing.
-
- Sincerely,
- Randy
-
- Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon
-
- Posted By: Allan <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon>
Date: Wednesday, 6 June 2001, at 7:33 p.m.
-
- In Response To: Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon (Randy)
-
- Hello Randy,
- Firstly and most importantly no apologies are needed and I concur with your asessment 100%. I have been finding that Nagumo has taken lumps that were not of his making. Certainly he was cautious as he relied heavily on his Air Staff and it showed throughout the course of 9 months. Although I have no documentation, I believe that the searches were purposed by the Air Staff and he went along with it, certainly he had the option of using several types of searches, but I've been cautioned not to rely too heavily on
Fuchida.
-
- The only way to gain any information, is to bring these types of operations out into the open, and have a frank and candid discussion........ and I do appreciate any and all input.
-
I too have been waiting for Willmott's third book, but it was "Empires in the Balance" that really stirred be. Paul Dull's book "The Battle History of the IJN" does not go indepth, nor does Stanley Woodburn Kirby (HMSO) "The War Against Japan" 1957/1969. Kirby was more indepth than Roskill or Morison, but it was tantalizingly vague. Only when Chris Shores came out with "Bloody Shambles" did I realize how large "C" Operation was. The movement of forces on land as well as sea, including the seizure of Christmas Island, the Andamans, the Burma Convoy (18th Div) and the reduction (As you will) of Ceylon. I have not read Ugaki's "Fading Victory", so I don't know if it is useful or not. The other is the the USSBS "Campaigns of the Pacific War", but that just refers to the operations by phases. The various IJN Monographs on the subject as just as vague, so I've been very cautious when approaching this topic.
-
- Your comment ..."why the Japanese chose to dilute their efforts against the USN by moving into the Indian Ocean." intrigue me. That decision was made not by Yamamoto, but by a compromise with the Army and Navy, to secure the objectives and provide support. Yamamoto was concerned about the "Raids" but had to wait for the conclusion (April 10th)of the 1st Stage of Operations and the return of his fleet to Japan. I believe John Toland wrote a segment on that subject, but I can't remember the title.
-
- As to the searches, I don't really have a clue, except that I remember a comment being made that the searches were a 120 degree fan, with the Battleship floats covering the flanks. Now I need to follow this up and find where I read this, but the pattern is very simliar to the one used at Midway, and I think those were Fuchida's or Genda's comments. I realize I'm going out on a limb here, so I need to verify this. So you see, I'm about where you are........
-
- Frustrated......
-
- Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon
-
- Posted By: Randy
Date: Wednesday, 6 June 2001, at 9:59 p.m.
-
- In Response To: Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon (Allan)
-
- Hi Allan:
- Allow me to look up many of the sources you mentioned as I have them. I find Toland to be a very credible source, as you may have heard me state before in some form or another. Fuchida is to be consulted with some caution.
-
- I intend to buy "Bloody Shambles," as I can not believe such a source could be poor. Thank you for further confirmation.
-
- Yes, the Army controlled so much and brought to bear enormous influence concerning operations in SEA. They were a driving force behind so many operations by action...or inaction. So I understand your comments in that regard.
-
- Note for Denis: Please bear with us Denis; actually, there is method to this madness. I would suggest you read Willmott for an overview of the strategic considerations regarding Operation "C" and other related offensives in the area of SEA. I think it fair to say Allan and I got off on a tangent and perhaps we distracted you...sorry. Ask for more help and I'll be happy to oblige.
-
- Sincerely,
- Randy
-
- Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon
-
- Posted By: Mark Shannon <mailto:Shingend@ix.netcom.com?subject=Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon>
Date: Thursday, 7 June 2001, at 7:08 a.m.
-
- In Response To: Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon (Randy)
-
- I believe there is only one explanation for the swing through the Indian Ocean. That was the original strategy all the time.
-
- Remember, the attack on Pearl Harbor was just a late addition to the plans, and all the plans were to ensure the capture and fortification of the Southeast Asia and Indonesian resources of oil, rubber, tin, and copper. All of the histories relate this essential strategy. (Wilmot, Morrison, Toland (when he was accurate), etc.)
- The Japanese strategists had a singlemindedness that included the assumption that the enemy would respond the way they, themselves would. The blunting of the American battlefleet at Pearl was considered in the plans as protecting the left flank of the overall assault. The right flank was to hold on, if the British fleet threatened the right, until the striking forces from Kido Butai were able to reinforce.
-
- The sinking of the H.M.S. Prince of Wales and H.M.S. Repulse was as much a pleasant surprise to the Japanese as it was a shock to the British. As far as the strategic plans, it was a bit of langianape. The drive through the center, into Java, Sumatra, and New Guinea, could now procede unimpeded.
- With this kind of thinking and planning, the sweep of Kido Butai into the Indian Ocean was something that was in the works from the beginning and still useful enough to complete.
-
- This kind of planning did tie Nagumo's hands more than a bit, and his goal probably also concerned conservation of resources. I would bet, as far as scouting and carrier protection duties were concerned, that some Japanese bean counter-type mind in planning decided the 'optimum' scouting and protection given the limited fuel and maintenance resources available. With the fixed view of both British and American strategic responses and the derogatory opinion of the individual enemy fighting man, it seemed like a good budget at the time. (Unadulterated purely my own speculation and opinions.)
-
- .Mark.
-
- Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon
-
- Posted By: Allan <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: IJN Sortie to Ceylon>
Date: Tuesday, 5 June 2001, at 1:21 p.m.
-
- In Response To: (Randy)
-
- Hello Randy,
- "C" Operation was a part of Phase 4, Stage 1 of their collective operations. While one may not agree with the Japanese planning, it went like this:
Kido Butai provided "Distant Cover" for the following:
1 - Ozawa's intrusion into the Bay of Bengal
2 - For the 3 convoys transporting 2 Divisions to Rangoon
Ozawa provided "Close Cover" for those transports plus interdicted merchant commerce raiding.
- Only after the conclusion of these operations, did the Army and Navy haggle what they were going to do next. I refer to Willmott's "Empires in the Balance".
- What Admiral Nagumo did, or didn't do, is conjecture, nor am I going to speculate, but Yamamoto seemed to be satisfied with the results. It did chase the Royal Navy to Mombasa where the climes were much better for them at the time. Somerville felt much relief, because he knew it could have been much worse, altho Churchill would disagree with that.
-
- Al
-
- Re: IJN Sotie to Ceylon
-
- Posted By: Barry <mailto:berry@operamail.com?subject=Re: IJN Sotie to Ceylon>
Date: Monday, 4 June 2001, at 2:54 a.m.
-
- In Response To (Deniz Karaçay)
-
- There is a book called 'Fleet Observer' (I think) by as the title suggests a FAA fleet observer who was with Somerville's fleet. Sorry I don't remember the author's name, but he provides some analysis of the campaign. I believe the Japanese were attempting to secure the right flank of their advance into South East Asia and support the operations in Burma. After all, the British Far Eastern Fleet was a 'fleet in being' just like the US fleet at Pearl Harbour, and Trincomalee and Colombo were substantial bases. One of the great 'what if' scenarios of the war I think