Midway
Topics:
 
Midway Aircraft/Crews
Lt. Kobayashi's and Lt. Tomonaga's Escort Fighters
TONE's & SORYU's Scouts in Midway ?
Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ?
Japanese Striking Group On Midway June, 1942 ?
Japanese fighters on Midway Island ?  
Lt.Ogawa KAGA's bomber leader in June 1942?  
Lt.Cmdr. Fuchida's pilot and radio man?  
2nd Car Civ Midway markings  
6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibility?
Zero CAP at Midway
Tone Scout No.4 at Midway
Lt. Cmdr Iyozoh Fujita at Midway  
Dick Best  
Japanese CAP at Midway  
Japanese CAP biggest ace  
Question about the Aleutian Strike (New)
"Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 1 *PIC* (New)
Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes (New)
 
Midway aircraft/Crews
 
Posted By: Jim Szabo <mailto:Nickel107@aol.com?subject=Midway aircraft/Crews>
Date: Thursday, 13 July 2000, at 2:17 p.m.
 
Does anyone happen to know, or can point me in the right direction, of finding the names of the crews that were with Tomonaga in his Kate, and Kobyashi in his Val.
Also, what were the tail codes?
Does anyone know of any good Coral Sea books or web sights? I'm gonna be going this direction too, eventually.
Thanks!
 
Re: Midway aircraft/Crews
 
Posted By: Tennessee Katsuta <mailto:kinson-garments@on.aibn.com?subject=Re: Midway aircraft/Crews>
Date: Thursday, 13 July 2000, at 8:07 p.m.
 
In Response To: Midway aircraft/Crews (Jim Szabo)
 
Hi, Jim.
Tomonaga's crew when he attacked the Yorktown were Ensign Akamatsu(I don't know his first name) and NAP 1/C Sadamu Murai. The tail code of his aircraft was BI-310 or BII-310, depending on who's theory you believe. I don't know who flew with Kobayashi, nor his tail code.
Cheers,
 
Re: Midway aircraft/Crews
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Midway aircraft/Crews>
Date: Saturday, 15 July 2000, at 8:17 p.m.
 
In Response To: Midway aircraft/Crews (Jim Szabo)
 
Jim;
Tomanaga, leading the strike on Midway:
Lt. Tomanaga Joichi (P)
Lt. Hashimoto Toshio (O)
PO1c Murai Sadamu (RO/AG)
Tomanaga, leading attack on USS Yorktown, CV-5:
Lt. Tomanaga Joichi (P)
Ens. Akamatsu Saku (O)
PO1c Murai Sadamu (RO/AG)
Kobayashi, leading attack on USS Yorktown, CV-5:
Lt. Kobayashi Michio (P)
WO Ono Yoshinori (O)
Hope this helps ...
 
Re: Midway aircraft/Crews
 
Posted By: Jim Szabo <mailto:nickel107@aol.com?subject=Re: Midway aircraft/Crews>
Date: Friday, 14 July 2000, at 6:24 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Midway aircraft/Crews (Tennessee Katsuta)
 
Thanks Tennessee. What do you mean about the theory? All the books I've read list Tomonaga as being part of Hiryu's air wing which would make his tail code BII, and give him two blue fuselage bands. What have you heard?
Also, in Fuchida's book "Midway, The Battle That Doomed Japan, The Japanese Navy's Story"; Ltjg Hashimoto - who flew with Tomonaga on the Midway assault - recalls seeing Tomonaga's plane erupt in a ball of flames while attacking Yorktown. He mentions how he knew it was Tomonaga because of his yellow tail. Would this be his hashmarks, vice a yellow painted vertical stabalizer and rudder?
Finally, What references do you have for crew members, and how can I find the same?
Jim
 
Re: Midway aircraft/Crews
 
Posted By: Randy <mailto:r.stone.eal@juno.com?subject=Re: Midway aircraft/Crews>
Date: Saturday, 15 July 2000, at 6:02 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Midway aircraft/Crews (Jim Szabo)
 
Hi Jim:
From John Lundstrom, "The First Team," U.S Naval Institute Press, 1984: Tomonaga departed Hiryu aboard BI-310 as Pilot. His crew consisted of Ensign Akamatsu Saku as Observer/Navigator and PO1c Murai Sadamu as Radioman/Gunner. With Yorktown only 90 miles away Tomonaga was correct in asserting he could fly there and back on the right tank alone. Lieutenant Kobayashi Michio piloted his Val from Hiryu with WO Ono Yoshinori as radioman/gunner.
 
Re: Midway aircraft/Crews
 
Posted By: Randy <mailto:r.stone.eal@juno.com?subject=Re: Midway aircraft/Crews>
Date: Monday, 17 July 2000, at 10:23 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Midway aircraft/Crews (Randy)
 
Hi Folks: It looks like I need the Pepper Medley for the crow...Tomonaga left Hiryu piloting BII-310. Lundstrom states "BI-310," but this simply can not be correct. He must mean BII-310.
 
Re: Midway aircraft/Crews
 
Posted By: David_Aiken <mailto:David_Aiken@hotmail.com?subject=Re: Midway aircraft/Crews>
Date: Tuesday, 18 July 2000, at 7:10 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Midway aircraft/Crews (Randy)
 
Aloha All,
Allan has one source, H. Yoshimura (Tennesee's source and mine) has another. One says ain't no way that the Hiryu codes changed when the ship became the Admiral's Flag ship. The other says the deck crew recalls painting the code change. We had discussed this several months ago and left it alone as no progress was made on either side of the question, except to point out one fact:
When the Ryujo was the sole carrier in the Fourth Carrier Division, the tail code was JUST a "D". As a second carrier joined the Division, the Ryujo changed its tactical code to "DI". Thus, tactically, codes were changed.
Could they change when the Flag changed? Situation unresolved.
Cheers,
David Aiken
 
Re: Midway aircraft/Crews
 
Posted By: Allan Alsleben <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: Midway aircraft/Crews>
Date: Thursday, 20 July 2000, at 9:58 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Midway aircraft/Crews (David_Aiken)
 
Aloha Dave,
The Navy Ministry assigned "D" to Ryujo. When Shoho became operational, the Ministry assigned the following:
Ryujo (DI)
Shoho (DII)
Cheers, Al
 
Re: Midway aircraft/Crews
 
Posted By: Jim Szabo <mailto:nickel107@aol.com?subject=Re: Midway aircraft/Crews>
Date: Thursday, 20 July 2000, at 2:44 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Midway aircraft/Crews (Allan Alsleben)
 
Fuselage band colors?
 
Re: Midway aircraft/Crews
 
Posted By: Randy <mailto:r.stone.eal@juno.com?subject=Re: Midway aircraft/Crews>
Date: Thursday, 20 July 2000, at 4:28 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Midway aircraft/Crews (Jim Szabo)
 
Hi Jim: They should be yellow.
 
Re: Tail Codes & CarDiv 2
 
Posted By: Allan Alsleben <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: Tail Codes & CarDiv 2>
Date: Sunday, 16 July 2000, at 8:32 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Midway aircraft/Crews (Randy)
 
Hello Members,
In a letter dated November 1st, 1999 in response to a letter sent October 6th, 1999 regarding tail codes. From the Military Department of the National Institute for Defense Studies in Toyko, The Honorable Retired Captain Kitazawa Noritaka points out".... the regulation was established in 1936 by the Navy Ministry. The Identification Codes were given to the ship. Not the Squadron." Hence, once the Navy Ministry issues the the codes, they can not be changed except by the Navy Ministry. So, Carrier Division 2 remained the same as it was on December 7th 1941.
After receiving the letter from Tokyo, I sent a copy to John Lundstrom and Jon Parshall. John Lundstrom's comments were " ... makes sense to me." That was on November 10th, 1999.
If anyone wishes a copy of this memo from Japan, let me know, and I'll send it on.
Regards, Al
 
Re: Midway aircraft/Crews
 
Posted By: Jim Szabo <mailto:nickel107@aol.com?subject=Re: Midway aircraft/Crews>
Date: Sunday, 16 July 2000, at 8:25 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Midway aircraft/Crews (Randy)
 
Many thanks to Randy, Tom and Tennessee for your help. I have another inquirey about a crew that I figured would be imposible to find out. But since you guys have literally amazed me with your information, I figure I'll give this a shot. How about the names of the crew on the #4 FM1 (Pete) scout plane from the Tone?
Thanks again,
Jim
 
Re: Midway aircraft/Crews
 
Posted By: Randy <mailto:r.stone.eal@juno.com?subject=Re: Midway aircraft/Crews>
Date: Sunday, 16 July 2000, at 7:21 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Midway aircraft/Crews (Jim Szabo)
 
Hi Jim: This is information from Lundstrom, not me. And I haven't anything on Tone No. 4 except that it was a Jake. There is a lengthy discussion of this topic on the board at 'Kaigun' which may help you even if it a little cumbersome to go thru.
 
 
Posted By: Emmanuel <mailto:aecastro1@aol.com?subject=Lt. Kobayashi's and Lt. Tomonaga's Escort Fighters>
Date: Monday, 11 December 2000, at 7:29 p.m.
 
FIRST OFF I have to Thank and give all the credit to Mr. Mark E. Horan for telling me all the Escorting Zero Pilots who join Kobayashi's and Tomonaga's Strike on USS Yorktown in the Battle Of Midway.
Lt. Kobayashi's Striking Force Escort:
Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero
1 Chutai (group) of 2 divisions of 3 plane Shotais
Chutai/Shotai/Plane:
1/1/1 Lt. Shigematsu, Yasuhiro - returned at 1338
1/1/2 POC2c Todaka, Noboru - shotdown
1/1/3 Sea1c Yoshimoto, Suekichi - shotdown
1/2/1 WO Minegishi, Yoshijiro - returned damaged at 1230
1/2/2 PO1c Sasaki, Hitoshi - returned then ditched at 1230
1/2/3 PO3c Chiyoshima, Yutaka - shotdown
All 6 aircrafts were HIRYU's fighters.
Lt. Shigematsu (Pearl Harbor veteran) was the fighter squadron executive officer (2nd Buntaicho).
WO Minegishi was squadron's senior shotai leader and also join in Lt. Tomonaga's Strike even though his plane damage.
Lt. Tomonaga's Strike Force Escort:
Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero
1 Chutai (group) of 3 divisions of 2 plane Shotais
Chutai/Shotai/Plane:
1/1/1 Lt. Mori, Shigeru - shotdown
1/1/2 PO2c Yamamoto, Toru - shotdown
1/2/1 WO Minegishi, Yoshijiro - returned at 1540
1/2/2 Sea1c Kotaka, Kenji - returned at 1540
1/3/1 PO1c Yamamoto, Akira - returned then ditched at 1730
1/3/2 PO3c Bando, Masahi - returned at 1640
Lt. Mori was the fighter squadron commander.
The first four fighters were HIRYU's.
PO1c Yamamoto and PO3c Bando were KAGA's pilots and aircraft
The ID marks are unknown but I hope someone can figure it out. Thanks
 
 
Posted By: Emmanuel <mailto:aecastro1@aol.com?subject=TONE's & SORYU's Scouts in Midway ?>
Date: Tuesday, 19 December 2000, at 1:13 a.m.
 
I was wondering when TONE's Scout #4 sighted the American fleet, Scout #4 send a message to Nagumo's strike force about it. An hour later the plane was never heard from it again, what happen to Scout #4 did the plane ever came to TONE? Does anyone know who drove this scout #4 Aichi D13A JAKE who were the pilots? Another thing when scout #4 was never heard from it again, SORYU launched their scout planes, what type of scout planes were launched? Was it the D4Y(s) or B5N(s)? How many were they launched? Who were the pilots? Which scout plane sighted the American fleet? Thanks a lot and I appreciate.
 
Re: A Soryu Scout in Midway Battle
 
Posted By: Tom Hall <mailto:Hall023038@aol.com?subject=Re: A Soryu Scout in Midway Battle>
Date: Tuesday, 19 December 2000, at 9:27 p.m.
 
In Response To: TONE's & SORYU's Scouts in Midway ? (Emmanuel)
 
Sorry, Emmanuel, but I haven't researched all aspects of your questions in this busy month. All I have seen is that a 13 Shi (prototype Judy) was sent to a position which was based on info provided by the Tone Number 4 plane. The aircrew of the 13 Shi were named Iida and Kondo. They eventually found a US carrier or two, but their position report was not received back at the Japanese ships because of a radio problem. This must have been terribly frustrating for the aircrew. Then, when they returned from their search, they had to land on Hiryu because Soryu was being destroyed. Only then were they able to tell where they had seen the US ships.
For some reason, this particular plane has captured our imaginations.
 
 
Posted By: Emmanuel <mailto:aecastro1@aol.com?subject=Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ?>
Date: Monday, 11 December 2000, at 7:51 p.m.
 
Can someone help me what type of seaplane Heavy Cruiser TONE used in the Battle Of Midway (June 1942) because TONE's seaplane scout number 4 sighted USS Yorktown's task group and Lt.Cmdr. Waldron's VT-8 heading 1st striking japanese carrier force also what was TONE's seaplane ID markings and color scheme? I appreciate and thanks a lot.
 
Re: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ?
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ?>
Date: Wednesday, 13 December 2000, at 6:20 p.m.
 
In Response To: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ? (Emmanuel)
 
The Tone & Chikuma carried five search aircraft each, 3 Jakes and 2 Daves. The search aircraft from Tone, flying in the number 4 search sector and thus, Tone #4 on 4 June, was a Jake.
As a point of interest, the Tone #4 plane did not, in fact spot VT-8 on 4 June. VT-8 departed TF-16 way too early to have been spotted by that plane. The TBD formation sighted and reported was, in fact, the newly launched VT-3 departing TF-17.
Hope this helps.
 
Re: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ?
 
Posted By: Bill Sanborn <mailto:bsanborn@psemc.com?subject=Re: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ?>
Date: Wednesday, 13 December 2000, at 9:56 a.m.
 
In Response To: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ? (Emmanuel)
 
After all that has been posted, I'd like to throw a monkey wrench in the works. According to "Tora! Tora! Pearl Harbor, The Aircraft and Airmen, December 7th, 1941" by Thorpe and Maloney, Daves were aboard the cruiser Tone (JI-2 to 4) at PH. The question becomes were these replaced by Midway? I seem to remember an article at navismagizine.com [a subscription internet mag. for modelers] about Tone's A/C markings that indicated the delayed flight was a Dave (I believe Mark Wlodarczyk [have not heard from him in a while] is of this opinion as well), but the link from Mark W.'s page (check it out below)is not valid so I will have to check for it at home.
 
Bill
 
Re: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ?
 
Posted By: Tennessee Katsuta <mailto:tennkats@hotmail.com?subject=Re: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ?>
Date: Monday, 11 December 2000, at 8:16 p.m.
 
In Response To: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ? (Emmanuel)
 
Hi, Emmanuel.
The aircraft was most likely an E13A Jake. The tail code would have been JI-1, 2 or 3. In Model Art's Pearl Harbour Attack Force book, there is a photo of an E13A taken on Sept.1942, presumably aboard Tone. What's interesting is that the float is painted overall IJN grey! Unfortunately you can't see the rest of the aircraft, but from this, one can deduce that the rest of the aircraft was also painted in overall IJN grey. Therefore, there is a good chance that the Jake at Midway would have been in overall IJN grey. Another photo, taken on Jan 1942, on the same page of this book shows a Jake in overall IJN grey. Although the only hinomaru visible on the photo are the underwing ones, there is clearly a white edge on the hinomaru. So, I believe the Jake at Midway would have had white edge on its hinomaru.
My friend Harvey Low wrote an excellent article on Jakes aboard Tone. If he sees this thread, perhaps he can comment on this matter.
 
HTH
Tennessee
 
Re: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ?
 
Posted By: Grant Goodale <mailto:grant.goodale@sympatico.ca?subject=Re: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ?>
Date: Tuesday, 12 December 2000, at 9:42 a.m.
 
In Response To:  (Tennessee Katsuta)
 
Tennessee
What are the chances that the Jakes from Tone and Chikuma had white-outlined hinomaru on the wing undersurface during the Hawaiian Operation ?
 
TIA
- Grant
 
Re: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ?
 
Posted By: Tennessee Katsuta <mailto:tennkats@hotmail.com?subject=Re: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ?>
Date: Tuesday, 12 December 2000, at 7:44 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Want to know Tone's Scout #4 in Midway ? (Grant Goodale)
 
Hi, Grant
Because the photo was taken on Jan.1942, I'd say there was a good chance that the Jakes at Pearl Harbour had white edge on wing undersurface hinomaru. The old edition Model Art Pearl Harbour Attack Force book shows a colour profile of Tone and Chikuma Jakes that were used for reconnaisance at Pearl Harbour. According to this, all hinomaru had the white edge.
 
Tennessee
 
 
Posted By: Emmanuel <mailto:aecastro1@aol.com?subject=Japanese Striking Group On Midway June, 1942 ?>
Date: Friday, 16 February 2001, at 6:02 p.m.
 
Hi,
I have read a lot of books on the Battle Of Midway June, 1942. According to these books when the Japanese attacked Midway Island, 18 B5N2 KATEs were involved in the attack. I'm kind of confuse about this, why is it 18 does it suppose to be 19 adding Lt.Tomonaga's B5N2 because I have seen a lot Japanese order of battle (Battle Of Midway) and Lt.Kikuchi led the 18 B5N2 KATEs and Lt.Tomonaga was not in the 18 B5N2s so that will add 19 B5N2s not 18. I think so.
 
Re: Midway Strike Force
 
Posted By: David_Aiken <mailto:David_Aiken@hotmail.com?subject=Re: Midway Strike Force>
Date: Friday, 16 February 2001, at 6:46 p.m.
 
In Response To: Japanese Striking Group On Midway June, 1942 ? (Emmanuel)
 
Hi Emmanuel,
According to Senshi Sosho: Midway Sakusen, page 295-6:
Lt Joichi Tomonaga led KATE strike, but the tactical units were broken in two where Tomonaga led Hiryu strike force (18 KATEs) against Sand Island and Heijiro Abe led 18 Soryu KATEs against Eastern Island. Lt. Rokure Kikuchi led the second unit (6 KATEs) in Tomonaga's Hiryu unit. One of Tomonaga's 18 Kates returned to the carrier with engine trouble. Hiryu lost 5 KATEs and Soryu lost 3 at Midway.
There are no tail codes given in the Senshi Sosho: Midway Sakusen as that data went down with the ships, except for select memories and select diarys.
Cheers,
David Aiken
Shinjuwan Sakusen Sensei
 
Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A
 
Posted By: Grant Goodale <mailto:grant.goodale@sympatico.ca?subject=Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A>
Date: Saturday, 17 February 2001, at 7:33 a.m.
 
In Response To: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:Aiken *No Text* (Emmanuel)
 
Emmanuel 
Considering the short time span between PH and Midway and the loss of the records at Midway, I would use Model Art 573 (PH Attackers) as the guide to a/c from the four carriers unless someone can prove you wrong. Looking at photos of AI-301 (Fuchida) at PH and during the Indian Ocean campaign (kindly supplied by Aiken-san), I think that it has the same paint job but with a lot more weathering and paint peeling.
I am not sure if the removed the numbers from under the wings of the B5Ns but I will hazard a guess that they were still there. I could be proven to be very wrong on that one.
 
FWIW
Grant
 
Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A
 
Posted By: Emmanuel <mailto:aecastro1@aol.com?subject=Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A>
Date: Saturday, 17 February 2001, at 5:12 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A (Grant Goodale)
 
Can you tell me the ID Marks for SORYU's Buntaichos (Double Blue Stripes)?
 
Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A
 
Posted By: Grant Goodale <mailto:grant.goodale@sympatico.ca?subject=Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A>
Date: Sunday, 18 February 2001, at 8:14 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A (Emmanuel)
 
Emmanuel
In MA 573, the only Soryu Kate with double blue command stripes on the tail is:
BI-311, double blue stipe. First wave torpedo. Pilot - Lt Totumo Nagai; Observer - WO Soichiro Taniguchi; Gunner - NAP 1/C Goro Ota
The names are presented in "Western" fashion with the surname last.
 
HTH
Grant
 
Re: Nagai's BI-311 is error
 
Posted By: David_Aiken <mailto:David_Aiken@hotmail.com?subject=Re: Nagai's BI-311 is error>
Date: Sunday, 18 February 2001, at 11:12 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A (Grant Goodale)
 
Aloha All,
On Dec 7, 1941, Lt Nagai's #2 wingman was Juzo Mori. In Mori's autobiography, he cited that his KATE was #12. Many thought this plane was that flown at Pearl Harbor, ie: "BI-312". However, a fellow pilot has confirmed data that HE flew BI-312. Research indicates that Mori's number "12" was flown in China.
As Model Art artist S. Nohara perhaps thought that the planes were issued in numerical order AND STAYED THAT WAY through Pearl Harbor. Nagai's plane would be BI-311 IF Mori's plane was BI-312.
Alas, for modelers, the plane numbers issued in April 1941 did NOT stay in numerical order with changes in tactical positions. For example, Buntaicho Shun Nakagawa [BII-213]'s wingman was BII-214 in April 1941, but by December BII-214 was wingman to another leader.
The suggested BI-311 artwork is thus in error. Be wary of the artwork in MODEL ART #378 and its reprint.
Cheers,
David Aiken
Shinjuwan Sakusen Sensei
 
Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A
 
Posted By: Allan Alsleben <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A>
Date: Saturday, 17 February 2001, at 10:30 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A (Grant Goodale)
 
Hello Grant,
According to the April 10th, 1942 directives, they dealt mostly with activation of units or deactivation of units. I could not find anything that dealt with paint schemes from the Navy Ministry and/or code changes. There were extensively covered in Monograph #116 which is Administrative in nature. Had there been a directive concerning paint schemes, it would have shown up long ago. The Academy (NIDS)had asssured me (Nov. 11th 1999*) that such an event did not occur.
 
*Captain Kitazawa Noritaka
National Institute for Defense Studies
Tokyo
Al
 
Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A
 
Posted By: Tennessee Katsuta <mailto:Tennkats@hotmail.com?subject=Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A>
Date: Saturday, 17 February 2001, at 12:39 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A (Allan Alsleben)
 
Hi, gentlemen.
According to Hitoshi Yoshimura, a number of old/battle weary aircraft were replaced with new aircraft fresh from the factory between Indian Ocean and Midway campaigns. What paint schemes were used on the new aircraft, and whether the older aircraft were repainted is anyone's guess.
 
Tennessee
 
Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A
 
Posted By: Allan Alsleben <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A>
Date: Saturday, 17 February 2001, at 1:16 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A (Tennessee Katsuta)
 
Gentlemen,
With all due respect to Yoshimura Hitoshi, has anyone investigated his claims? Would Yamaguchi Toman circumvent Naval Regulations regarding paint schemes and Tail Codes? The regulations sent down by the Navy Ministry is quite clear, they are assigned to the ship, not the Flag Officer. The Navy Ministry assigns codes bands and whatever to the ship. In case of land based units, it is assigned to that Kokutai, not the commander. The regulations are really quite clear. This has been in effect since 1932 and later amended November 15th, 1936. Please investigate the regulations rather than word of mouth.
I have no doubt that some painting did take place within CarDiv 2, but Hiryu codes were painted out and Soryu's ID only. That would have been within Admiral Yamaguchi's sphere of influence, but not to change the codes. The question I ask is this, Would Admiral Yamaguchi circumvent Naval Regulations???? I don't believe so, they were all too steeped in Naval Tradition, even Admiral Yamamoto would not circumvent regulations, an for what purpose I ask??
I have strong doubts with editorals without documentation, and this is just another example of an editoral that did not research deep enough and took the word of one person. Yet, the regulations exist even today if one is willing to search it out. The burden of proof rests not with me, but to those that refute the regulations that were in place at the time.
 
Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A
 
Posted By: Tennessee Katsuta <mailto:Tennkats@hotmail.com?subject=Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A>
Date: Sunday, 18 February 2001, at 9:09 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A (Allan Alsleben)
 
Dear Allan.
If you read over my previous message, you will realize that I haven't said anything about changing the tail codes. I just merely pointed out that some battle weary aircraft were exchanged with new ones, so the paint schemes may have been altered from the time of Pearl Harbor. I do not know if alteration of paint scheme took place, but it is a definite possibility for the following reasons.
1. At Pearl Harbor, Vals were painted in overall IJN grey, but by Indian Ocean Campaign, the upper surface was painted green. There are photos of such Vals belonging to Soryu and Shokaku.
2. At Pearl Harbor, Shokaku's Kates had the upper surface painted in green (with or without brown) mottles and squiggles, with sides of the fuselage spared. By Coral Sea, the upper surface was painted in solid green with white edge on the fuselage hinomaru. There is a photo of a crashed Kate tail code EI-306 taken immediately after the battle.
According to your research, no alteration in the paint scheme was ordered on April 10 1942. I respect that, and even if that was the case, some alteration of the schemes did take place somewhere between Pearl Harbor and Coral Sea, at least in some aircraft. Photographic evidences support this. Anyway, all I'm saying is since such changes took place between Pearl Harbour and Coral Sea with some aircraft, there is a definite possibility that the paint schemes of the 2nd carrier division Kates at Midway can be different from Pearl Harbor. That was the question here, whether or not the Pearl Harbor paint schemes were retained until Midway, wasn't it? These changes may not have taken immediately before Midway as I indicated in the previous message, but if it did, it at least would have taken place sometime between Pearl Harbor and Coral Sea. Of course, the converse may be equally true in that the 2nd carrier division Kates may just as well carried the same scheme as Pearl Harbour. However, the rather unclear photo of the Kates of the 2nd carrier division at Kendari on Feb.1942 shows them in solid green rather than the mottled apperance at Pearl Harbor. I apologize if I gave the impression that I was poo-pooing your statement regarding the April 10 1942 directive, because that was not the intention. Incidentally, can you find directives issued before April 10 1942 that touches onto the alteration of paint schemes of Soryu and Shokaku's Vals and Shokaku's Kates? It will be very interesting if you can.
As for the tail code issue, I don't know what happened at the time of Midway, but I do know that judging from his articles, Mr. Yoshimura is a serious researcher, and his theories are not what he just pulled out of thin air. In the 1980's he conducted interviews after interviews with IJN veterans, in some cases travelling half way across Japan just for an interview, for his research on Hiryu aircraft. He may be wrong and you may be correct regarding this tail code issue, but I do respect his hard work as much as I respect yours. I deliberately omitted the tail code issue from my previous message, but there seems to be no way to avoid this short of not posting anything on the message board.
 
Tennessee
 
Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A
 
Posted By: Allan Alsleben <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A>
Date: Sunday, 18 February 2001, at 9:29 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: What About The Model Art Special for PH ? To:A (Tennessee Katsuta)
 
Hello Tennessee,
I'm in the process of obtaining the Title and Paragraph of the regulation that deals with "Tail Codes, Paint Schemes and Bands" that were set up by the Navy Ministry. I'm not out to change anything, but to clarify what was in place after April 10th, 1942. The previous post was not meant to defame or other wise embarrass, but maintain an awareness. When I get this from Japan, I'll send you a copy as I promised Tom sometime back. There needs to be closure so this can move on.........
 
Re: Japanese Striking Group On Midway June, 1942 ?
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Japanese Striking Group On Midway June, 1942 ?>
Date: Friday, 16 February 2001, at 6:31 p.m.
 
In Response To: Japanese Striking Group On Midway June, 1942 ? (Emmanuel)
 
Midway was attacked by 35 kanko and 36 kanbaku escorted by 36 kansen. The missing kanko aborted and returned to Hiryu.
Hiryu 17 0 9
Soryu 18 0 9
Akagi 0 18 9
Kaga 0 18 9
 
 
Posted By: Emmanuel <mailto:aecastro1@aol.com?subject=Japanese fighters on Midway Island ?>
Date: Monday, 12 February 2001, at 6:32 p.m.
 
Hi,
I know that a fighter or escort squadrons had two Buntaichos in June 1942. For AKAGI it was Lt.Saburo Shindo and Lt.Ayao Shirane. For KAGA I know one only it was Lt.Sato Masao. For HIRYU it was Lt.Shigeru Mori and Lt.Yasuhiro Shigematsu. For SORYU it was Lt.Masaharu Suganami and Lt.Iyozo Fujita.
I want to know the KAGA's 2nd Buntaicho fighter pilot name and rank? Thank you very much.
I would appreciate there ID marks in each craft I mention except for Lt.Shindo and Lt.Mori. I know this is hard but I would gladly hear some of it. Once again Thank you very much.
 
Re: Japanese fighters on Midway Island ?
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Japanese fighters on Midway Island ?>
Date: Thursday, 15 February 2001, at 2:46 p.m.
 
In Response To: Japanese fighters on Midway Island ? (Emmanuel)
 
Lt. Sato Masao was the senior kansen officer on Kaga, but did not fly any missions at all at Midway.
Lt. I-izuka Masao led the Kaga kansen Chutai over Midway on 4 June 1942.
LCdr. Itaya Shigeru was the senior kansen officer on Akagi, but he too did not fly any missions at Midway.
Lt. Shirane Aya-o led the Akagi kansen Chutai over Midway.
Lt. Ibusuki Masanobu was the next senior kansen officer on Akagi flying fighter patrols over Kido Butai
Lt. Suganami Masaji led the Soryu kansen Chutai over Midway.
Lt. Fujita Iyozo was the next senior kansen officer on Soryu flying fighter patrols over Kido Butai.
You are correct that Mori and Shigematsu were the two senior kansen officers on Hiryu. The later flew over Midway, the fomer over Kido Butai.
 
 
Posted By: Emmanuel <mailto:aecastro1@aol.com?subject=Lt.Ogawa KAGA's bomber leader in June 1942?>
Date: Monday, 12 February 2001, at 6:41 p.m.
 
Hi,
Can someone tell me Lt.Shoichi Ogawa's D3A1 ID markings and too his other crew's name and rank? I appreciate and Thank You very much.
What I know he was involved in the Midway Island Attack on Lt.Tomonaga's group. He led his KAGA D3A1s squadron and for AKAGI D3A1s squadron I'm sure it was Lt.Chihaya.
 
Re: Lt.Ogawa KAGA's bomber leader in June 1942?
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Lt.Ogawa KAGA's bomber leader in June 1942?>
Date: Thursday, 15 February 2001, at 2:37 p.m.
 
In Response To: Lt.Ogawa KAGA's bomber leader in June 1942? (Emmanuel)
 
Lt. Ogawa Shoichi (P)
WO Yoshikawa Katsumi (RO)
 
 
Posted By: Emmanuel <mailto:aecastro1@aol.com?subject=Lt.Cmdr. Fuchida's pilot and radio man?>
Date: Sunday, 11 February 2001, at 9:16 p.m.
 
Hi,
Can someone tell me Lt.Cmdr. Fuchida's (group commanding officer of AKAGI) pilot and his radio man (rear seat) names? I know that Lt.Cmdr. Fuchida was the observer (second seat) also what was Lt.Cmdr. Murata's (attack squadron commanding officer of AKAGI) B5N2 ID Markings? What place was he a pilot, observer, or radio man? This is going to be hard I think but what was Lt.Cmdr. Murata's crew names and ranks? I appreciate and Thank you very much.
 
PH or Midway Lt. Chihaya's pilot name ?
 
Posted By: Emmanuel <mailto:aecastro1@aol.com?subject=PH or Midway Lt. Chihaya's pilot name ?>
Date: Sunday, 11 February 2001, at 9:04 p.m.
 
Hi,
I know that Lt.Chihaya (bombing squadron commanding officer) used a D3A1 in Pearl Harbor and Midway. What I know he was not a pilot he was an observer (rear seat). I was wondering can someone tell me who was he's pilot name and what rank was he? Did this pilot participate in Midway? If not can you tell me the name and rank? I appreciate. Thank you.
 
Re: Lt. Chihaya and pilot
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Lt. Chihaya and pilot>
Date: Monday, 12 February 2001, at 7:31 a.m.
 
In Response To: PH or Midway Lt. Chihaya's pilot name ? (Emmanuel)
 
On 4 June 1942 the Akagi Kanbaku Buntai formed part of the Midway Striking Force. Lt. Chihaya Takehiko (not Lt.Cdr.) led the strike. His pilot was PO1c Yoshida Kiyoto.
 
 
Posted By: Mike Yeo <mailto:mikeyeo@bigpond.com?subject=2nd Car Civ Midway markings>
Date: Friday, 16 March 2001, at 7:05 a.m.
With the release of the recent Scale Aviation photos of Tomonagas Midway Kate can we now say for certain that Soryu aircraft carried the BII-xxx tailcode while Hiryus was BI-xxx?
Thanks in advance,
Mike
 
Re: 2nd Car Civ Midway markings
 
Posted By: Jon Parshall <mailto:jonp@combinedfleet.com?subject=Re: 2nd Car Civ Midway markings>
Date: Friday, 16 March 2001, at 9:10 a.m.
 
In Response To: 2nd Car Civ Midway markings (Mike Yeo)
I asked Hyodo Nisohachi that same question about two weeks ago, and he didn't hesitate to reply that Hiryu was BI-xxx and Soryu BII-xxx. So I am leaning that way myself.
jon parshall
Imperial Japanese Navy Page
http://www.combinedfleet.com
 
Re: 2nd Car Civ Midway markings
 
Date: Friday, 16 March 2001, at 1:54 p.m.
In Response To: Re: 2nd Car Civ Midway markings (Jon Parshall)
I agree with Jon - leaning yes - absolutely - without knowing the sources for those markings, I would not say that. Certainly there is a great deal of debate about the accuracy of the other markings listed
 
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibility?>
Date: Friday, 16 March 2001, at 4:31 p.m.
 
Jon, Jim, and gang;
My understanding is that it was customary to carry "cargo" aircraft were carried in a partially disassembled state and that they were not equipped with arrestor gear. At Coral Sea, Zuikaku & Shokaku were carrying (IIRC w/o looking) 9 Zeros for transfer that did not have hooks and were incapable of returning to the carrier when they ran into a weather front after launch.
I have done a careful study of the Japanese fighter operations at Midway, including every flight. However, I like to think I always have an open mind, so… In response to Jon's original question last night, I went over all my research notes again, and re-examined each aspect of the issue. This is what I have come up with:
Each of the four carriers was carrying 6th AG Zeros in addition to their own complement, specifically:
Akagi..19 + 6 cargo
Kaga...18 + 9 cargo
Hiryu..18 + 3 cargo
Soryu..18 + 3 cargo
The air combat of Kido Butai on 4 June was incredibly intense. At several points, almost the force's full allotment of fighters was in the air. It is equally clear that at several points in the action, there was a noticeable effort to utilize all the fighters available, including those held for the reserve strike.
None the less, it is clear from the air group records (which are all extant) that, for sure, the last three of the four carriers (Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu) made no attempt to utilize either the pilots or planes of the 6th Air Group that they had on board. The maximum fighters utilized by each was:
Kaga: 16 of 18 between 0700-0710; 15 of 17 (1 having been lost) between 1000-1025
Hiryu: 18 of 18 between 0615-0659
Soryu: 18 of 18 between 0705-0730
Only on Akagi was there any effort to utilize the 6th Air Group assets on board. The three pilots Jon mentioned flew one watch, departing at 0710 with one aircraft returning at 0736 and the other two at 0859.
Akagi had 18 of a believed total of 19 Zeros aboard in action between 0655-0659, all flown by her own pilots [her 19th pilot did not fly at all that day. Also, this indicates that at least 18 were operational].
However, at 0710, when the 6th AG shotai departed, Akagi had 20 aircraft in the air, and remained at that strength until 0730-0736, by which time 5 had landed, 2 had been lost, and 14 remained in the air. This level was not again reached until between 0833-0859, during which Akagi maintained 16 Zeros in the air (the 2 others having been lost of course). Two of the aircraft were being flown by 6th AG pilots, but the other was back on the ship. Between 0859-1026, Akagi never used more than 14 Zeros, and no more were lost.
Summarizing the facts we know:
1. Akagi had 19 of her own Zero pilots on board
2. Akagi had six 6th AG pilots on board
3. Akagi utilized 18 of her own pilots
4. Akagi utilized three of the 6th AG pilots
5. Akagi utilized 18 of her own Zeros at one point
6. Akagi utilized 17 of her own and three 6th AG for a brief 26 minute period
7. Akagi utilized 16 of her own pilots (with two others lost) and two 6th AG pilots for another brief 26 minute period
There are, IMO, two possibilities.
1. Akagi actually had 20 Zeros of her own, but only 18 pilots fit for duty. Therefore, for a brief period of intense aerial activity, she utilized a shotai of experienced 6th AG pilots. Thereafter, battle damage left her with enough of her own pilots to do the trick.
2. Akagi had on 18 Zeros and pilots of her own available, and managed to make available three of the 6th AG Zeros early on. The shotai leader, Lt Kaneko Tadashi, returned early (0736) in a shot up aircraft. The remaining two stay aloft until 0859. For whatever reason (battle damage?) Akagi has but 14 operational Zeros thereafter, including these three 6th AG planes, and as she has enough pilots of her own to fly them.
The former case, had always been my hypothesis. Working against it is the fact that there are on 19 pilots on board, a very odd situation on an IJN carrier who, like the RN, seldom carry spare pilots or planes. Also, the fact that Akagi had at least 18, and perhaps 19operational Zeros meant that only one or two 6th AG Zeros were needed reach the necessary number, 20. However, After re-examining my notes this later argument is flawed (see below).
The later case can also make a lot of sense. Working against this is my understanding, from very knowledgeable Japanese sources, that cargo aircraft in general, and the 6th AG aircraft in particular, were carried partially disassembled and without arrestor gear.
However, it is worth adding that, while reexamining my research, something suddenly leaped out at me. At 0659 Akagi had 15 aircraft in the air (9 over Midway, 6 on CAP) and three just landed. At 0710, she re-launched five Zeros piloted by two from her own shotai on deck plus the three from the 6th AG. If one assumes (and you know where that can get me) that one of Akagi Shotai was battle damaged, then the magic number is really 21, not 20, which means a full shotai of 6th AG Zeros is necessary. (Akagi having 21 Zeros of her own with but 19 pilots is just not plausible IMO. Thus, IMO, a strong case can be made that three 6th AG Zeros WERE launched at 0710. But how would this be possible if they were disassembled?
I think I have an answer. Jon's new info n the Akagi's hanger (kindly copied to me a while ago) might be the telling issue. Perhaps, of the four carriers in Kido Butai, ONLY Akagi had the hanger space to carry some of her cargo (three Zeros) fully assembled. Conversely, the overloaded Kaga [with 27 torpedo planes], as well as the smaller Hiryu & Soryu, had to carry them dissembled. If this is the case, it would explain everything. IMO, it is entirely possible that, at somebody's urging, Akagi's hanger gang made a concerted effort to make these assembled aircraft operational [adding spare tail hooks if necessary] either before hand or during the morning. On the initial flight, there were not enough of Akagi's own pilots to fly them. However, as battle damaged Zeros landed leaving pilots available, the 6th AG found themselves off the "hotseat".
You can now all set up and have at me …
 
Re: A Nagging Question.........
 
Posted By: Allan Alsleben <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: A Nagging Question.........>
Date: Saturday, 17 March 2001, at 6:58 p.m.
 
In Response To: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibility? (Mark E. Horan)
 
Mark,
It just hit me, how were these carriers overloaded? Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu did not have their collective reserve aircraft on board. The 3 fighters on each of these carriers went to outfit Zuiho and the same with the attack aircraft. The VB's went to Junyo to outfit her group. How so were they overloaded? The 6th Ku made up for the shortfall. Junyo was only partially equipped with fighters and the balance was made up with 6th Ku.
Zuiho took Shoho's place with the 2nd Fleet when Shoho was sunk off Misima.
In reality, Kido Butai was in serious trouble! They had no reserve and operated with a bare minimum. Nagumo did not, nor for that matter, Yamaguchi, use the additional assests as you mentioned. I don't like assuming, but what would have happened if the 6th Ku was on CAP and Kido Butai were used for strike purposes? It's quite possible that the outcome might have been different.......
 
Al
 
Re: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibil
 
Posted By: Chuck Nimsk <mailto:cnimsk@aol.com?subject=Re: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibil>
Date: Friday, 16 March 2001, at 9:17 p.m.
 
In Response To: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibility? (Mark E. Horan)
 
Mark:
The following is taken from John Lundstom's "The First Team" page 187: "For the two 5th Carrier Division fighter units, the MO Operation had commenced with an unusual assignment, that of air ferrying to the land-based Tainan Air Group a badly needed reinforcement of nine Zero fighters.....The Tainan group had no spare pilots, and the carrier pilots were expected to fly the Zeros to Rabual and then return by carrier attack planes....The morning of 2 May the carriers launched the nine Zeros and seven kanko to bring back the pilots, but the weather was so poor they could not fight their way through the 240 miles to Rabual and had to abort...a second ferry attempt went more poorly than the first. Not only did the sixteen aircraft again have to turn back because of storms, but one of the Shokaku Zeros was forced to ditch."
On the next page is a breakdown of the 5th Carrier Divisions strength going into the Coral Sea. Listed are the 8 Zeros for the Tainan Group - the ninth had of course ditched and been lost.
The above strongly indicates that the aircraft were equipped with arrestor hooks as they obviously (IMO) returned to the carrier and landed safely after the failed attempts to fly to Rabual.
In my opinion, it is most likely that Zeros for the 6th Ku were equipped with tail hooks and that these were not removed. After all, what if, after Midway had been taken and the aircraft were launched to land there, one suffered a problem or something? It is logical that they would have left the hooks on the aircraft for emergencies, not to mention the possibility of returning to a carrier at some future date. As has been brought out elsewhere in this stream, some US squadrons did remove the tail hooks from their aircraft when land based, but not till after they had arrived at their base. Also..on a Zero the tail hook fit into a recess under the rear fuselage. If it were removed then there would have been a drag inducing "hole", whereas for American aircraft such as the F4F Wildcat, F6F Hellcat, and F4U Corsair, the hook was carried internally meaning removal would have meant only a weight savings, not additional drag.
Otherwise...I think you're analysis of the situation at Midway on the morning of June 4 seems completely logical to me. For what it's worth..I buy it!
 
Chuck Nimsk
 
Re: Okay - I stand corrected :)
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Okay - I stand corrected :)>
Date: Friday, 16 March 2001, at 9:29 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibil (Chuck Nimsk)
 
Clearly, the notes I made to myself contain some errors of fact. Why I thought (and worse, wrote it up in my notes) that those Zeros did not get back to the carrier is beyond me - especially since I have two copies of "The First Team" only 6 feet away.
I'm a guessen it won't be the last time I make a "mistook" either - though I hope the next one isn't quite as stupidly made.
 
Re: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibil
 
Posted By: James F. Lansdale <mailto:LRAJIM@aol.com?subject=Re: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibil>
Date: Friday, 16 March 2001, at 5:53 p.m.
 
In Response To:  (Mark E. Horan)
 
Mark
Thank you for your great posting and analysis. I would like you, if possible, to give me the sources and specific quotes for which you write:
1) "9 Zeros for transfer that did not have hooks and were incapable of returning to the carrier when they ran into a weather front after launch."
2) "this is my understanding, from very knowledgeable Japanese sources, that cargo aircraft in general, and the 6th AG aircraft in particular, were carried partially disassembled and without arrestor gear."
and
3) " At Coral Sea the Zeros launched from Zuikaku and Shokaku were sent off without arrestor gear."
Jim Lansdale
 
Re: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibil
 
Posted By: Allan Alsleben <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibil>
Date: Friday, 16 March 2001, at 5:20 p.m.
 
In Response To: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibility? (Mark E. Horan)
 
Hello Mark,
Firstly, any aircraft not belonging to the ships company is classed as "Cargo". As mentioned, they were brought onboard by Iwakuni Ku. None were dissembled. Consider the time element to assemble under ideal conditions let alone combat conditions...... it just doesn't wash, the time just wasn't there, and as to other "A" pilots, there were a total of 21 "A" pilots, but I don't know how they were distributed, so I would venture a guess that some of these carriers didn't have "A" Pilots and that would determine their usage.
Secondly, Naval regulations state that no aircraft can operate from a carrier without arrestor gear. The only exception would be land-based and that was left up to the local commander.
Thirdly, it seems highly unlikely that the host would allow guest pilots to operate the host's aircraft unless there were more aircraft than pilots. The 6th Kokutai did indeed operate their own aircraft, as they did against Dutch Harbor and as CAP for Kido Butai.
With all due respect, I doubt that Nagumo or Yamaguchi would circumvent Naval Regulations set down by the Aeronautical Department (Navy Ministry). Arrestor Gear was mandatory November 15th, 1932 and not changed.
As to CarDiv 5 carrying aircraft to Rabaul, these were assembled and had arrestor gear altho they too were listed as "Cargo", but again, they were not part of the ship's company.
In IJN Parlance, Anything not belonging to ship's company is listed as "Cargo", whether its on a Carrier or Destroyer, if it doesn't belong to ship's company, its "Cargo". This itself is not unusual.
 
Re: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibil
 
Posted By: Jon Parshall <mailto:jonp@combinedfleet.com?subject=Re: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibil>
Date: Sunday, 18 March 2001, at 9:37 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibil (Allan Alsleben)
 
Hey Mark,
I, too, remain somewhat skeptical that these aircraft were carried disassembled, but I can't prove it yet! :-) You mentioned (correctly) that Akagi had the hangar space to carry those extra Zekes assembled (i.e. without resort to using the lower third hangar). I rather imagine that Kaga had enough real-estate, too, but I haven't tried building a hangar stowage diagram for her yet. I now have a good electronic plan of her upper decks drawn, and I will sit down and try cramming in all those aircraft sometime in the next few days--I am getting pretty good at it! Kaga's main problem is that her forward elevator well really chops up the usable space it the forward part of the hangars--Zero wings don't fold worth beans, and it's really hard to get efficient packing up there and still retain good straight lines for pulling the aircraft out. Anyway, I will try and do that and see what I come up with.
Soryu and Hiryu will be tougher, because I don't have my internal plans of them drawn yet. However, again I gotta think that 3 extra Zeros wouldn't need to be disassembled. One quick and easy way to solve this would be to examine how many aircraft CarDiv 2 carriers operated at Pearl (including CAP), and then see what their max operational aircraft was. If this is greater than the aircraft complement at Midway + 3 cargo aircraft, then you can be reasonably assured that the 6th Ku planes were assembled.
 
I'll let you know what I find out about Kaga.
Cheers,
-jon parshall-
Imperial Japanese Navy Homepage
http://www.combinedfleet.com
 
Re: A Very Nagging Question.....
 
Posted By: Allan Alsleben <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: A Very Nagging Question.....>
Date: Sunday, 18 March 2001, at 10:28 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: 6th AG at Midway - a new look - a new possibil (Jon Parshall)
 
Hi Jon,
None of the carriers (Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu) had reserve aircraft. According to John Lundstrom's memo, the reserve aircraft went to Zuiho except the VB, and those I assume went to Junyo which was fitting out. Where is the overload?? According to capacity, Akagi could carry 91 aircraft, Kaga 90, Hiryu and Soryu 73 each. CarDiv 2 had 57 aircraft at Midway including 6th Ku - Akagi had 61 and Kaga had 72. There should have been ample space to accomodate all of the aircraft embarked.
 
Al
 
Re: A Very Nagging Question.....
 
Posted By: Jon Parshall <mailto:jonp@combinedfleet.com?subject=Re: A Very Nagging Question.....>
Date: Sunday, 18 March 2001, at 3:41 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: A Very Nagging Question..... (Allan Alsleben)
 
In a nutshell, those aircraft stowage numbers were for early 1930's vintage aircraft, and also include disassembled aircraft within the total. Ain't no way you're gonna put 91 fully assembled 1942-vintage planes on Akagi; I can guarantee you that. The Type 99 and Zero just kill you in terms of flexibility, particulartly the 99. As a matter of fact, I just got done doing a stowage diagram for Kaga this afternoon (which then crashed my computer, so I can't post the GIF yet until I do the diagram *again*), and she can *barely* haul the 72 aircraft she had at Midway without resort to the lower hangar and/or disassembled aircraft. 90 assembled aircraft on Kaga is an impossibility without using a deck park.
 
Cheers,
-jon-
 
Re: A Very Nagging Question.....
 
Posted By: Randy
Date: Sunday, 18 March 2001, at 8:33 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: A Very Nagging Question..... (Jon Parshall)
 
Hi Jpon:
I appreciate the work you and the other guys have been doing.
Keep up the good work. You are on the right track. What you are doing is far beyond fiction and more on line to reality. This is not a fiction piece; what you're doing is akin to fact as we can determine by research and common sense.
But I would encourage you to post on the Net as it will bring out the 'nut cases' and help you to refine your arguments against these same people. This will be all to your advantage.
 
Sincerely,
Randy
 
Kaga Hangar Stowage Diagram *PIC*
 
Posted By: Jon Parshall <mailto:jonp@combinedfleet.com?subject=Kaga Hangar Stowage Diagram *PIC*>
Date: Sunday, 18 March 2001, at 7:52 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: A Very Nagging Question..... (Jon Parshall)
 
Here's a good look at Kaga's hangar situation with her 72 aircraft (63 of her own + 9 6th Ku). You'll note that the usable space in the hangars is further chopped up by the fireproof screens that subdivide the hangar decks. My plans don't show all of the screens on the upper hangar, but I have inferred their positions from those on the lower hangar deck (which are clearly marked). 6th Ku aircraft are shown in Kaga markings--sorry about that. Bottom line is that I could probably cram in another 5-6 aircraft if I needed to, although it would be tough--Kaga's hangar forward has very weird spaces on the port side around the forward elevator. On the face of it you'd think you could just stuff a Zero in there sideways, but you really can't because you'd never be able to get it back out again (planes don't roll real well side to side, doncha know...). So I figure her top-end capacity for assembled aircraft is about 77-78, depending on the type. Putting more kanbaku in would be very hard to do, because their wings don't fold worth a damn.
 
 
Hope that's useful.
Cheers,
-jon-
 
Re: Kaga Hangar Stowage Diagram
 
Posted By: Jon Parshall <mailto:jonp@combinedfleet.com?subject=Re: Kaga Hangar Stowage Diagram>
Date: Monday, 19 March 2001, at 6:38 a.m.
 
In Response To:  (James F. Lansdale)
 
I only wish that were true! A shotai; yes. A chutai.... ummmm... :-) I mean, I'm one of those guys who looks at a 24-foot U-Haul and firmly believes that *everything* will fit, no matter what "everything" is, but even this has its limits! :-) Nevertheless, this *has* been a useful exercise. I strongly suspect that at the time of the fatal attack against her, Kaga's hangars were opened up in terms of those fireproof screens, not that it would have made any difference in her case, but it might have in Akagi's.
 
Cheers,
-jon-
 
Re: Question
 
Posted By: Jon Parshall <mailto:jonp@combinedfleet.com?subject=Re: Question>
Date: Monday, 19 March 2001, at 9:26 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Question (Mark E. Horan)
 
Those are intriguing comments indeed. However, the internal plans I have seen of Japanese hangar stowage schemes show far less regularity. I think this may have something to do with the enclosed nature of their hangars--they were very irregularly shaped. You are correct that the most efficient schemes are fairly symmetrical--you'll note that the Type-97s fold up just and nest just beautifully fore and aft. So I used that approach for the torpedo planes, and (to a lesser extent) the kanbaku. But the funky shape of Kaga's hangars forward necessitates getting pretty creative with packing in the Zeros; there's just no way around it.
Positions for aircraft were pre-determined, and were marked with painted outlines on the deck. That must have been a bear with changes in aircraft types, and I wonder how often they re-painted. They would have had to, though, when a new model came out, since the wing folding characteristics of the bird are the driving factor in determining stowage.
The tie-downs on Japanese flight and hangar decks were set in a 1.5 meter grid, and the wings (at least, and maybe other sections of the aircraft as well) were tethered with wire cables at all times, whether they were above or belowdecks. (Japanese kept their planes tethered until very late in the take-cycle, too--tethers went away right before the wheel chocks were removed.) The wheels were also chocked belowdecks, which takes up some of the pressure as well.
In general, the Japanese tried to keep a half meter or so (IIRC) of space between the aircraft, but in practice I have seen diagrams (particularly of Hiryu's innards) where the aircraft actually overlap slightly. This is possible because since these aircraft are all tail draggers, so when they are on the ground their wings and engine cowlings are significantly higher than their horizontal stabilizers. That means you can tuck a stabilizer under an adjacent plane's wing, say. Hiryu's plans clearly show that occuring in the Type-97 park. That must have made for difficulties in servicing, but that was the only way to jam them all in.
Cheers,
-jon-
 
 
Posted By: Cesare <mailto:cesaspe@tin.it?subject=Zero CAP at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 27 March 2001, at 3:58 p.m.
 
I am interested in understand the use of ZERO as cap in Midway, especially how many there were against each US attack and why many drowned instead of going to Hiryu. I have read about two Kaga planes that went with the Tomonaga strike, but I have lost the name of the pilots and their kills, and these details I need for a model .
Thanks for your help.
Cesare
 
Re: Zero CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Zero CAP at Midway>
Date: Wednesday, 28 March 2001, at 2:58 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Zero CAP at Midway (cesare)
 
An "ad hoc" Shotai of two Kaga pilots did indeed participate in the escort of Tomanaga's Strike on Yorktown. The two pilots were:
PO1c Yamamoto Akira, the senior shotai leader on Kaga and a Pearl Harbor veteran. He participated in the 1st CAP of the day and defended Kido Butai when it was attacked by the TBFs and B-26s from Midway, landing at 0800. He again took to the air at 0830 and remained aloft through the Great CAP, landing on Hiryu. The escort mission was his third of the day. After returning, he stayed aloft on CAP and finally was forced down for lack of fuel and rescued by the destroyer Hagikaze. He was killed over Yachimata 24 November 1944 while flying as a member of the Yokosuka Air Group.
PO3c Bando Masahi participated in three CAP missions. In the first, from 0700 to 0730, he saw no action, standing by Kaga while the other carriers were attacked. The second was from 0815 to 0930. The third commenced at 1000 to defend against VT-6, and he flew throughout the Great CAP, landing on Hiryu. Thus the escort mission was his fourth flight of the day. He survived the mission to land on Hiryu, survived her bombing, and ultimately survived the war.
See Lundstrom's book "The First Team" for the details of their escort mission.
 
Re: Zero CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: cesare <mailto:cesaspe@tin.it?subject=Re: Zero CAP at Midway>
Date: Wednesday, 28 March 2001, at 1:40 p.m.
 
In Response To:  (Cesare)
 
Thanks Mark !!
I have been searching for this information for years, and you have done me a great gift!
Do you have also a detail about the name of pilots and the deeds of the two Kaga's Zero that Fuchida said were launched with the Tomonaga strike ? I read that one of those two pilots was the best Japanese ace of the day, but I have lost the source.
Thanks again.
Cesare
 
Re: Zero CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: cesare <mailto:cesaspe@tin.it?subject=Re: Zero CAP at Midway>
Date: Wednesday, 28 March 2001, at 3:21 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Zero CAP at Midway (Mark E. Horan)
 
Thanks! I am amazed!
Your resource is priceless, I'll search that book asap!
As you have understood, I am looking about for the true actions happened during the battle of Midway.
If you permit,I have another question. Why all those Zero landed on Hiryu weren't of help in defend her against the last SDB attack? Prange quote only 10 operational Zero at about 1700, and only few of the in CAP: of course, more planes could have diverted the US strike or at least disturbed the bombing. Thanks.
 
Re: Zero CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Zero CAP at Midway>
Date: Wednesday, 28 March 2001, at 5:55 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Zero CAP at Midway (cesare)
 
Unfortunately, Prange is hardly a good source. While he did a tremendous amount of research with Japanese sources, it was all at high levels (Admirals). Further, he just acquired the information - he did not write his book - he had died - the bok was written grad student(s), who knew little if anything about what Prange had.
Anyway:
At 1640 Hiryu had the following fighters:
Akagi. 4 on ship; 4 in air (1 would ditvh at 1700)
Kaga.. 4 on ship; 5 in air; 1 strike escort returning alone
Hiryu. 6+3 on ship; 0 in air
Soryu. 2 on ship; 4 in air
Thus, there were 14 Zeros in the air and 16 on the ship. Not all of those on the ship were operational - 10-12 at most would seem reasonable. It is not believed that the three (+3 above) cargo Zeros (6th Air Group aircraft) were used - certainly the 6th Air Group pilots were not - but the planes may have been.
Of the aircraft on the ship, six were prepared to escort the planned third strike due to take off at 1800. Thus, there were at most 4-6 reserve fighters remaining on the ship when she sighted the USN strike force at 1655. The twelve Zeros overhead put up a very creditable defense - they downed three SBDs (three more than were lost in the Great CAP between 1010-1045) and shot up three fairly badly.
 
Re: Zero CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: cesare <mailto:cesaspe@tin.it?subject=Re: Zero CAP at Midway>
Date: Thursday, 29 March 2001, at 1:25 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Zero CAP at Midway (Mark E. Horan)
 
Thanks Mark for all your work.
Now I am entering in some thoughts about your stats, to understand them well and delete some wrong ideas I had before. Excusing in advance for the poor quoting, I give you an example: her in Italy I found an old traslation of Lord that stated the story of three Akagi pilots: Raita Ogawa orbited around Akagi until his fuel finished, and being Hiryu too far north ditched with his two wingman in the wake of cruiser Chikuma, that went against the waves to flatten them for the landing. This is why I believed many more ditched, specially becsuse all my other book said about wery few zero on Hiryu, probably perhaps numbering only those in flight at any given time. Now I'll go to compare your digits to understand more about the ratios of air-to-air combat: I don't understand the loss of 13 zero of the 'Great Cap' against only a few SBD.
Thanks again.
 
Re: Zero CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Zero CAP at Midway>
Date: Thursday, 29 March 2001, at 2:35 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Zero CAP at Midway (cesare)
 
Unfortunately for Lord's fine work, Ogawa was a pretender - he answered Lord's request for correspondence with veterans, and happily wrote much - even though there was no such Japanese pilot and he was not even a WW II veteran!
 
Re: Zero CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: cesare <mailto:cesaspe@tin.it?subject=Re: Zero CAP at Midway>
Date: Thursday, 29 March 2001, at 2:53 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Zero CAP at Midway (Mark E. Horan)
 
Wow! You know a lot about my preferite argument.
Do you know why near 25% of the zero in the Great Cap were lost? I wonder also why, with 43 figthers aloft, there were not at high level against the SBD at 1030: if only they have disturbed the divers, maybe Akagi wuold not have the two (2!) fatal hits, and with two operational carriers the outcome of the battle would have be different.
If I can ask also, I have found in the web an interesting article, ""The Battle of Midway:Why the Japanese Lost "" © 2000 Dallas Woodbury Isom . What is your opinion about?
Thanks.
Cesare
 
Re: Zero CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Zero CAP at Midway>
Date: Thursday, 29 March 2001, at 3:28 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Zero CAP at Midway (cesare)
 
There has been a lot of new Midway research recently. Isom offeres some excellent points concerning the armament procedures for the torpedo planes of Kido Butai, but his other ascertians, particulalry those on the supposed time factors concerning the Tone #4 plane, and his references to how close Kido Butai was to actually launching a second strike are incorrect and easily disputable with facts that are known to be correct.
Jon Parshall, Tony Tully, and David Dickson have authored a rebuttal to Isom, purely from the point of view of japanese doctrine, that, IMO, thoroughly refutes Isom's concusions. It, too, will run in the Naval War College Review shortly - so I won't steal their thunder concerning their conclusions.
I can, and at some point will, offer what I feel is very convincing arguements as to why there was no time issue between the Tone plane and Nagumo.
Suffice it to say, at this point, that Kido Butai was, at no time after 0700, 4 June 1942, close to launching the second striking force. Further, the aircraft were never, even in the morning, ranged on deck. This is well known in Japanese sources, but is virtually unknown in Western sources. Further, the striking force was not close to raedy to launch at 1030. Rather, they were just beginning to range the aircraft on Soryu and Hiryu with the intent to launch around 1100.
Now, why were there such high losses in Zeros - an interesting question. First, Lt.Cdr. John S. "Jimmy" Thach and his "beam defese tactic" ("weave") worked. When his division was jumped, the Japanese acted as if they expected the USN fighters to, in effect, "throw in the towel" by breaking apart where the Japanese numbers would, invariably, win out. owever, Thach's startling reaction caught them unawre, and none of them were able to "solve" the riddle in that comabt. All indications are that Thach and Dibb did, in fact, get at least four Zeros. It is also clear that Cheek and Sheedy, the close escort fighters, got two more.
Of the rest, Japanese AA got at one, and at least two more made controlled force-landings at sea after suffering serious hits from SBD free-gun fire. Another was shot down by the free-gunners of VT-3 (VT-6 got one earlir too). The other three most likely were lost attacking the SBD formations.
The SBDs, each armed with two .30 caliber free-guns, were all low to the water. Without a bomb and with only some 60 gallons of fuel left on board, they were very nimble and able to offer a concerted defense, even in the small groups they hastily formed. The SBD proved then, and on numerous other occassions, to be very tough to bring down and to have fangs of their own! of course, it did not hurt that many of the Zeros had exhausted their 20 mmm cannon ammo by the time they faced the SBDs (a mear 60 rounds per gun fully loaded - 120 rounds total).
Basically, the fight from 0920-1045 (VT-8, VT-6, VT-3, VF-3, VB-3, VBS-6) was massive and deadly. It involved 95 USN aircraft and 52 Japanese aircraft (43 at any one time tops) - and it lasted all of 85 minutes. This was not similar to any other action to date. The Zeros got 34 TBDs and 1 F4F outright - but lost 14 of their own.
Give me a shout back channel (my e-mail) - I can give you an article I just finished writing.
 
Re: Zero CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Jon Parshall <mailto:jonp@combinedfleet.com?subject=Re: Zero CAP at Midway>
Date: Thursday, 29 March 2001, at 8:51 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Zero CAP at Midway (Mark E. Horan)
 
I'm not quite ready to steal my thunder yet, either, because the article has not been accepted by NWC yet--I'm still doing the editing thing with the editors there. I rather imagine it will get in there eventually, though, or so I hope. And it will contain somme argumenst that many folks on this list will find interesting, I think.
But Mark is right; there is a lot of new research going on in the field that is going to lead to clarification of the Japanese side of the record, we hope. Mark has mentioned the outlines of some of those corrections, including ones that stem from Isom's article, and my personal pet project: the number of hits against Akagi, which I think can be reliably demonstrated to be just one. You are correct in pointing out that had the dice fallen slightly differently, Akagi might very well have gotten off scott free. More details to come...
Cheers,
-jon parshall-
Imperial Japanese Navy Homepage
http://www.combinedfleet.com
 
Re: Zero CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: cesare <mailto:cesaspe@tin.it?subject=Re: Zero CAP at Midway>
Date: Thursday, 29 March 2001, at 3:51 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Zero CAP at Midway (Mark E. Horan)
 
Wonderful detail!
Excuse me, but the SDB went without loss from the CAP, only from AA ? I remember a detail about Enterprise SBD aircrafts that I found in the web giving a total of 17 loss on 4 june.
Gratefully
Cesare
 
Re: Zero CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Zero CAP at Midway>
Date: Thursday, 29 March 2001, at 5:00 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Zero CAP at Midway (cesare)
 
Correct, no USN SBDs were brought down by direct action with Zeros in the morning attack on Kido Butai.
The seventeen SBDs of VB-3 withdrew, by luck, unmolested.
Thirty-two SBDs of the Enterprise Air Group approached Kido Butai. One, from VB-6, force-landed out of fuel just after sighting Kido Butai, leaving thirty-one to attack.
The Commander Enterprise Air Group (CEAG) section of three (Air Group Commander plus two VS-6 wingmen) attacked Kaga. All three missed and returned to CV-6 though two of the SBDs were out of commission from, mainly, 20 mm cannon hits.
Scouting Squadron Six (VS-6), fourteen strong, attacked Kaga likely getting seven hits. One was shot down in the dive, seven force-landed from fuel exhaustion on the way home, and six returned to CV-6 - none were damaged.
Bombing Squadron Six (VB-6) was also fourteen strong. Eleven attacked Kaga, likely getting three hits. Two returned to CV-6 (one out of commission), two retuned to CV-5 (one out of commission, both being lost with the ship on 7 June), and seven force-landed from fuel exhaustion on the way home. The remaining three attacked Akagi, getting one true hit, one extremely close miss (3-5 yards) and another near-miss (10 yards). All three withdrew safely and returned to CV-6.
Thus, of thiry-two Enterprise SBDs that reached Kido Butai, sixteen were lost (1 AA, 15 fuel), two returned to CV-5 (lost), and fourteen returned to CV-6 (3 of which out of commission).
 
Re: Zero CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Zero CAP at Midway>
Date: Wednesday, 28 March 2001, at 9:57 a.m.
 
In Response To: Zero CAP at Midway (Cesare)
 
The number of CAP Zeros in the air against each attack on Kido Butai is as follows:
#1 NAS VT: 23 plus 5 more launched; 2 lost
#2 VMSB-SBD: 8 plus 3 more launched, plus 1 Zero and 6 Vals from the Midway Striking Force; 1 lost
#3 VMSB-SB2U: 10 plus 10 more launched; 0 lost
#4 B-17s: 3 plus 9 from the Midway Striking Force; 0 lost
#5 VT8: 21 plus 9 launched; 0 lost
#6 VT6: 27 plus 15 more launched; 1 lost
#7 Great CAP (VF-3, VT-3 & VBS-6): 36 plus 7 more launched; 13 lost
As to why so many ditched - many didn't!
The is a doctrinal issue. The fighters on CAP were tasked with defending their own carrier, as best as they saw fit under the limited guidance of the various air controllers. The three carriers bombed between 1022-1026 sustained near catastrophic damage almost immediately, which took the air controllers off the air virtually instantaneously. At that point, the Zeros from Kaga, Soryu, and Akagi were on their own. None had any real idea how badly hit the carriers were for some time and thus did not think to leave their on flight deck undefended immediately. However, all but one reached Hiryu.
Of 43 Zeros in the air during the final attack, 13 were lost, leaving 30. Of them, 7 Akagi, 10 Kaga, 6 Soryu, and of course, the 6 Hiryu fighters, returned to Hiryu. Only 1 Akagi fighter remained orbitting Akagi until forced to ditch.
Tone Scout No.4 at Midway
 
Posted By: Mike Yeo <mailto:mikeyeo@bigpond.com?subject=Tone Scout No.4 at Midway>
Date: Sunday, 13 May 2001, at 8:17 a.m.
 
Would anybody happen to know the tailcode of the Tones Scout No.4 at Midway? I would like to build this aircraft from the Nichimo Jake and would appreciate it if anyone could furnish me with it's details.
 
TIA
Mike
 
Re: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway
 
Posted By: Rick <mailto:rcorrao@globecommsystems.com?subject=Re: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway>
Date: Monday, 14 May 2001, at 9:38 a.m.
 
In Response To: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway (Mike Yeo)
 
Hi Mike,
I think the cruisers Tone and Chikuma both carried Type 0 'Pete' floatplanes at Midway. Also some 'Dave' biplanes were launched from other ships. I don't remember reading that any Jakes were used in that operation. Maybe someone else on this forum can give you a better answer.
 
Rick
 
Re: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway
 
Posted By: Mike Yeo <mailto:mikeyeo@bigpond.com?subject=Re: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 15 May 2001, at 6:13 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway (Rick)
 
Rick,
the sources I have read indicate Scout No.4 was a Type 0 Recon Floatplane, which was an Aichi E13A1 "Jake". A sighting report by TF16(or 17, I can't remember) describes spotting a "single engined, twin float seaplane" on the morning of 4 June. The Mitsubishi F1M "Pete" was known as the Type 0 Observation Floatplane, and had a single float.
 
Mike
 
Re: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway
 
Posted By: Grant Goodale <mailto:grant.goodale@sympatico.ca?subject=Re: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway>
Date: Sunday, 13 May 2001, at 9:18 a.m.
 
In Response To: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway (Mike Yeo)
 
Mike -
Based on my limited knowledge of the Pearl Harbour attack, in Dec 1941, the tail code would be JI-4
 
HTH
- Grant
 
Tone Scout No.4 at Midway
 
Posted By: Andrew Obluski <mailto:aoba41@yahoo.com?subject=Tone Scout No.4 at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 15 May 2001, at 7:28 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway (Grant Goodale)
 
Hello
TONE & CHIKUMA carried 5 floatplanes [3 E13A1 and 2 E8N2] each during MI Sakusen. Aichi E13A1 Jakes were numbered 1, 4 and 5 on the ship. Nakajima E8N2 Daves were numbered 2 and 3 on the ship. Aircraft attached to the TONE were coded JI- and attached to the CHIKUMA were coded JII-. TONE Class cruisers did not carry Mitsubishi F1M2 Petes at that time.
 
It is sure that TONE's recco floatplane [E13A1] that discovered USN fleet was numbered JI-1 v JI-4 or JI-5. When referring to 'TONE's No 4 floatplane', authors think about number assigned to various recco planes by the First Air Fleet. TONE's planes were assigned central patrolling sectors so No 4 belonged to one of them.
Some sources state that Lt Hiroshi Amari was commander of TONE's E13A1 floatplane. According to the Isom's article published in the Naval War College Review in 2000 all members of this crew were killed during the war. I recommend reading this article as it assess Japanese recco crews in different way as in the past.
 
Regards
Andrew
 
Re: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway
 
Posted By: cesare <mailto:cesaspe@tin.it?subject=Re: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 15 May 2001, at 3:04 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway (Grant Goodale)
 
I have lost the exact web address, but I found it in www.nwc.navy.mil , and then looked for any article having 'midway' . It is very interesting, expecially for the different way the work of TONE4 is concerned. I wonder why #5 plane didn't see anything, perhaps because US carriers were under heavy clouds I read, but wasn't blamed and all the guilt is on TONE#4
HTH
Cesare
 
Re: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway
 
Posted By: Jon Parshall <>
Date: Tuesday, 15 May 2001, at 8:39 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Tone Scout No.4 at Midway (Grant Goodale)
 
A couple of comments:
1) According to information provided to me by Jim Sawruk, the #4 search line was in fact coincidentally searched by Tone's #4 aircraft. He lists takeoff times as follows:
CHIKUMA #4 0138
CHIKUMA #1 0135
TONE #4 0200
TONE #1 0142
These equate to Search lines #6, #5, #3, and #4 respectively.
 
2) While the nominal compliments of Tone and Chikuma were 3 Type 0 (Jake) and 2 Type 95 (Dave), Tone appears to have one plane either missing or down. I quote Mr. Sawruk here:
 
"I have gone thru Nagumo's Report and there is no doubt that there are 5 aircraft aboard CHIKUMA on 5 June (4 June our time). TONE has 4 aircraft mentioned: #1, #3, #4 & #5. I suspect there may be an error here as #5 is only mentioned once as being picked up later in the day. It could in fact be the #2 plane misrecorded although the original Japanese shows #5! In another document, #2 is mentioned in an ASW role while #5 is not mentioned."
It is unclear whether this plane would have been a Jake or a Dave.
 
3) The link to the Isom article is:
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2000/summer/art3-Su0.htm
 
4) I found out last week that Tony Tully, David Dickson, and my counter-article to Isom will be published in the Naval War College Review later this year. Just a little advance press--watch for it.
 
-jon parshall-
Imperial Japanese Navy Homepage
http://www.combinedfleet.com
 
Lt. Cmdr Iyozoh Fujita at Midway
 
Posted By: Amos H. Terrell <mailto:ATerrell@KScable.com?subject=Lt. Cmdr Iyozoh Fujita at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 23 October 2001, at 9:11 p.m.
 
Hi All;
Just wondering if any info such as tail codes, carrier, etc is known for this pilot, or any others in the Kido Butai CAP?
Thanks in Advance
 
Soryu #1 Buntai
 
Posted By: JIm P.
Date: Friday, 26 October 2001, at 3:55 p.m.
 
In Response To: Lt. Cmdr Iyozoh Fujita at Midway (Amos H. Terrell)
 
Name Plane Class Fate Vic.
Lt. Masaji Suganami B BI-181 61st Flt. Class KIA 14.11.42
Ens. Hira Tanaka S BI-184 NCO 19 #6 Survived war.
PO1c Takeo Sugiyama S BI-187 NCO 26 #7 Survived war.
PO1c Iwao Mita BI-182 Ko 2 Last KIA 4.7.44
PO1c Mitsuomi Noda BI-188 Ko 2 #10 KIA 29.3.44
PO2c Kyoichiro Ogino BI-185 NCO 44 #3 KIA 25.10.42
PO2c Kaname Yoshimatsu BI-189 NCO 41 Last KIA 5.4.44
PO3c Nobutoshi Furukawa BI-186 NCO 45 #10 KIA 23.8.42
Sea1c Yoshio Iwabuchi BI-183 NCO 56 #5 KIA 10.8.44
The source is 'Senshi Sosho, Vol. 43'.
 
Re: Lt. Cmdr Iyozoh Fujita at Midway
 
Posted By: Greg Springer
Date: Wednesday, 24 October 2001, at 7:15 a.m.
 
In Response To: Lt. Cmdr Iyozoh Fujita at Midway (Amos H. Terrell)
 
Hi Amos!
This one's easy for me. Same markings and code as are thought to be for Iida at Pearl Harbor. BI-151 with two blue buntaicho stripes on vertical stab. and one blue fuselage band. On Fujita's machine the blue markings were a much lighter shade than on Iida's. This can be seen in the photo taken at Kendari which is in Bob Mikesh's Zero book from Motorbooks Int'l.
 
Cheers!
Greg
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject=Re: Correct>
Date: Saturday, 27 October 2001, at 12:13 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: For the record, Lt, not LCdr (NT) (Amos H. Terrell)
 
Amos;
You are correct in what I was saying. At Midway, Lt. Fujita Iyozo was the second most senior officer in the Soryu kansen buntai behind Lt. Suganami Masaji. Fujita led the second chutai. He flew two fighter patrols over Kido Butai. He was promoted later in the war.
 
Yes, he was promoted later. As he belonged to Eta Jima Naval Academy 66th graduation class, he must have been promoted to Lt. Cdr. in 1945.
 
Regards,
Katsuhiro
Dick Best
 
Posted By: Tom Matlosz <mailto:slayer14@bellsouth.net?subject=Dick Best>
Date: Sunday, 4 November 2001, at 12:15 p.m.
 
To all,
With a great sense of loss, I am sad to report that Lt Cmdr Richard H. "Dick" Best, USN (Ret) passed away on October 26th, at age 92, in Santa Monica, CA. As most of you will know, Dick was the Commanding Officer of Bombing Squadron 6 (VB-6) aboard the USS Enterprise during the Battle of Midway. On 4 June 42, Dick and his section, comprised of Fred Weber and Bud Kroeger, severely damaged the IJN carrier Akagi, leading to its eventual sinking.
I had the privelege of several phone conversations and numerous mail correspondence with Dick in '98 and '99. His memory was keen and he was very opinionated in his recollections. It was his opinion that Wade McCluskey (Commander Air Group 6) had screwed up, not attacking per doctrine, leading all of Bombing and Scouting 6 against the Kaga. Had Best not recognized the situation and had not redirected his section's strike against Akagi, the results at Midway might have been totally different.
 
Fred Weber did not survive the afternoon strike on Hiryu. Bud Kroeger is still with us, living in the Mid-West.
 
Tom Matlosz
 
Re: Dick Best
 
Posted By: Barrett <mailto:btillman63@hotmail.com?subject=Re: Dick Best>
Date: Sunday, 4 November 2001, at 7:35 p.m.
 
In Response To: Dick Best (Tom Matlosz)
 
Dick was a remarkable individual, totally dedicated to his profession to the exclusion of all else. His first fleet squadron was VF-2, the Flying Chiefs, but when he returned to sea duty in 1040 he requested SBDs because he felt he could be of most use there in the coming war with Japan. After 7 December he sent his family to the States, fully intending to remain in combat until the war was over. He was bitter about his medical discharge, feeling he had left things undone. However, about the time I got to know him (mid-70s) he had a change of heart. "You know," he liked to say, "the last day I touched a stick I sank two carriers." He felt that was a far more fitting departure than if he'd spent 40 years on active duty. He really loved dive bombing, and I think if it had been an Olympic event he'd have won the gold!
 
Speaking of bombs, here's a site devoted to Japanese naval aviation ordnance.
http://www.clubhyper.com/reference/japanesebombsdw_1.htm
 
Re: Dick Best
 
Posted By: Jim Eyerdom <mailto:jheyerdom@aol.com?subject=Re: Dick Best>
Date: Friday, 9 November 2001, at 5:19 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Dick Best (Barrett)
 
Barrett,
Immensely enjoyed (and highly recommend) your "Dauntless Dive Bomber of WWII" which I picked up over 20 years ago, and just re-read sections of it again to review your quotations from Dick Best about the Midway battle.
Noting the comments in the text as to the confusion about which group (VB-3, VB-6 and VS-6) hit which carriers, has that been finally resolved since then, or is there still some disagreement on that subject?
thanks for the great reading material,
Jim Eyerdom
 
Re: Dick Best
 
Posted By: Barrett <mailto:btillman63@hotmail.com?subject=Re: Dick Best>
Date: Friday, 9 November 2001, at 5:29 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Dick Best (Jim Eyerdom)
 
Thanks, Dave, much appreciated.
The consensus (?) now is that McClusky and 26 others dived on Kaga; Best and his two wingmen hit Akagi. VB-3 went after Soryu. There may still be a bit of dissention among the remaining Yorktowners but Bob Elder's statement covers the bases: "All I can say is, it was the biggest damn thing I ever saw!"
Japanese CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Andrew Johnson <mailto:ajo@ceh.ac.uk?subject=Japanese CAP at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 4:25 a.m.
 
Something that has always bothered me about the Midway story. We know that the SBDs' had no air opposition when they dived on the Japanese carriers. I would have thought that the Japanese would have a CAP doctrine that would always keep up a high cover CAP, whatever else was happening, knowing the opposition possesed dive-bombers? Is this the case, but that the torpedo bomber threat was just too overwhelming to ignore? Also how much, if any, fighter direction did the Japanese have in 1942?
 
Thanks if you can help
Andrew
 
Re: Japanese CAP biggest ace
 
Posted By: Cesare <mailto:cesaspe@tin.it?subject=Re: Japanese CAP biggest ace>
Date: Wednesday, 26 September 2001, at 2:28 p.m.
 
In Response To: Japanese CAP at Midway (Andrew Johnson)
 
I am wondering how many kills had Fujita at Midway, and if he was the best ace of the day.
Also, I have read in 'The first team' about the flight of Akira Yamamoto as escort against Yorktown: he didn't score anything, but did he shoot an SBD on the last bobmbing of Hiryu? and did he shoot any plane in the previous attacks in the morning? 
 
TIA
Cesare
 
Re: Japanese CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: David Dickson <mailto:ddickson@firstam.com?subject=Re: Japanese CAP at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 1:20 p.m.
 
In Response To: Japanese CAP at Midway (Andrew Johnson)
 
It was a breakdown of discipline. Their doctrine called for fighter cover at 3000/4000/5000meters. Their tables of organzation for Midway air ops were fairly specific on the point. I dont have them at hand, but generally a ship would have a 3 plane shotai at 4000 meters or two 3 plane units at 3000 & 4000 meters or three 3 plane units at 3-4-5. I think the actual altitudes may have been slightly different, but cant be sure.
Their doctrine specifically stated that the CAP was NOT to get involved with one target to the exclusion of other potential threats. They were wiping up the floor with the VTs and lost control.
Since they lacked radar they relied on air patrols and ship lookout information. In the case of the former they described a circle around their ships at 20-25km. Eight airplanes were to cover 45 degrees each along the circle.There is no evidence that they actually conducted these patrols the day of the battle. Pre-radar USN doctrine wasnt that different.
They never had fighter direction as we understand that term today(or even in 1944 USN/RN).
Japanese CAP biggest ace
 
Posted By: Andrew Johnson <mailto:ajo@ceh.ac.uk?subject=Japanese CAP at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 4:25 a.m.
 
Something that has always bothered me about the Midway story. We know that the SBDs' had no air opposition when they dived on the Japanese carriers. I would have thought that the Japanese would have a CAP doctrine that would always keep up a high cover CAP, whatever else was happening, knowing the opposition possesed dive-bombers? Is this the case, but that the torpedo bomber threat was just too overwhelming to ignore? Also how much, if any, fighter direction did the Japanese have in 1942?
 
Thanks if you can help
Andrew
 
Re: Japanese CAP biggest ace
 
Posted By: Cesare <mailto:cesaspe@tin.it?subject=Re: Japanese CAP biggest ace>
Date: Wednesday, 26 September 2001, at 2:28 p.m.
 
In Response To: Japanese CAP at Midway (Andrew Johnson)
 
I am wondering how many kills had Fujita at Midway, and if he was the best ace of the day.
Also, I have read in 'The first team' about the flight of Akira Yamamoto as escort against Yorktown: he didn't score anything, but did he shoot an SBD on the last bobmbing of Hiryu? and did he shoot any plane in the previous attacks in the morning? TIA
Cesare
 
Re: Japanese CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: David Dickson <>
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 1:20 p.m.
 
In Response To: Japanese CAP at Midway (Andrew Johnson)
 
It was a breakdown of discipline. Their doctrine called for fighter cover at 3000/4000/5000meters. Their tables of organzation for Midway air ops were fairly specific on the point. I dont have them at hand, but generally a ship would have a 3 plane shotai at 4000 meters or two 3 plane units at 3000 & 4000 meters or three 3 plane units at 3-4-5. I think the actual altitudes may have been slightly different, but cant be sure.
 
Their doctrine specifically stated that the CAP was NOT to get involved with one target to the exclusion of other potential threats. They were wiping up the floor with the VTs and lost control.
 
Since they lacked radar they relied on air patrols and ship lookout information. In the case of the former they described a circle around their ships at 20-25km. Eight airplanes were to cover 45 degrees each along the circle.There is no evidence that they actually conducted these patrols the day of the battle. Pre-radar USN doctrine wasnt that different.
 
They never had fighter direction as we understand that term today(or even in 1944 USN/RN).
 
Re: Japanese CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Peter <mailto:f14peter@yahoo.com?subject=Re: Japanese CAP at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 10:18 a.m.
 
In Response To: Japanese CAP at Midway (Andrew Johnson)
 
Grant's right, the CAP had descended to low level to pounce upon the torpedo planes. This demonstrates a lack of descipline since apparently not one Zero remained at high altitude and I've read many accounts that said the Zeros were flying into each others way during their runs on the torpedo attack. Also, the Japanese fleet didn't have the radar to detect an incoming raid and it is also my understanding that they didn't have an effective "Fighter Control" system with direction from a ship based commander.
Remember, this was one of the early attacks the Japanese fleet had experienced by such a large number of aircraft and they may not have quite figured out how to operate an effective CAP over a formation.
 
Re: Japanese CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Andrew Johnson <mailto:ajo@ceh.ac.uk?subject=Re: Japanese CAP at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 10:30 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Japanese CAP at Midway (Peter)
 
Thanks Grant and Peter
In essence as all the zeros' came down to attack the torpedo bombers, where some disobeying orders to stay up high and keep an eye out for dive-bombers? Alternatively,do you think there were no such orders,and the flight leaders of CAP were simply told to 'play it as you see it'? To my mind the existence, or absence of such directives was one of the most important factors in the battle.
 
Cheers
Andrew
 
Re: Japanese CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Peter <mailto:f14peter@yahoo.com?subject=Re: Japanese CAP at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 4:44 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Japanese CAP at Midway (Andrew Johnson)
 
I agree with George in that this was still early in the war and CAP tactics hadn't been refined to a high degree.
For some reason, I seem to recall reading somewhere that the Zeros were sent up with orders that in essence said, "Patrol and protect the fleet" and direction wasn't forthcoming from the ships. Also factor in the series of successes of the flyers, from Pearl Harbor to the Indian Ocean, and I think they saw the torpedo planes and everyone went after them with little coordination. Image the course of history had half (Or even one-third) of the Zeros remained at altitude and disrupted some or all of the SBDs attack . . .
 
Re: Japanese CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: George Crozier <mailto:ggc9_@hotmail.com?subject=Re: Japanese CAP at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 12:20 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Japanese CAP at Midway (Andrew Johnson)
 
Andrew:
I think that carrier tactics were still being developed by both sides at this stage of the conflict. Given the hesitation of the Japaneese commander to launch for the second strike that left the Japaneese carriers poorly situated to receive an attack it may not be surprising that his CAP was not in a better position. Some think that luck,or fate, or devine intervention played a role in the USN dive bombers catching the IJN carriers in such a vernerable position. Whatever your preference, the loss of four carriers and their aircrews was a turning point in the Pacific war.
ggc
 
Re: Japanese CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Jon Parshall <mailto:jonp@combinedfleet.com?subject=Re: Japanese CAP at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 1:21 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Japanese CAP at Midway (Grant Goodale)
 
The Japanese *did* have formal doctrine regarding placement of CAP assets both in terms of compass bearing and altitudes. Kaga's after action report also provides insight into optimal placement of these assets; perhaps these were intended as potential corrections to doctrine, I dunno. The Japanese understood the need for having stacked planes at several different altitudes, and also the need to keep groups spread out around the force.
Fighter direction was difficult to achieve, obviously, before the advent of search radar. I have not come across any mention of their being a designated TAO-type of officer aboard Japanese carriers. Indeed,the Japanese *never* got to the point of integrating air defense functions in a single location a la the U.S. Combat Information Center (CIC). The CIC is one of those little innovations that doesn't get a lot of press but that was absolutely essential to the order of magnitude increase in efficiency of American late-war CAP and air defense.
 
The other thing you'll note in the Nagumo Report is that the Japanese rely on Tone and Chikuma to act as director vessels--by firing their main 8" batteries in the direction of incoming enemy attacks. The idea was that the splashes would attract the attentions of the CAP fighters and in essence vector the needed assets to towards the point of attack. It should be noted, too, that this method (while crude) did the job reasonably well against the torpedo aircraft, which were chewed up badly.
 
There's little question, though, that their CAP overcompensated against VT-8 and particularly VT-3, chasing them too far to the NE and out of the combat zone. On the other hand, given the dispersed nature of the Japanese task force by this time, dispersion of CAP effort was also inevitable. The CAP had to protect *all* the carriers, and with the carriers spread all over the place--you get the idea. Furthermore, it is clear that the period of CAP activity over the fleet in the hour and a half prior to the fatal dive-bomber attack was pretty wild, and the Japanese were largely in a reactive mode. They were losing planes at an unprecedented rate (for them) and had to constantly be launching replacements to make up for the casualties. Integrating those new elements into the overall structure of the defense couldn't have been easy. My guess is that they simply took off and went to whatever action they could see. All of these factors tended to diminish the coordination and aggregate effectiveness of the defense.
 
Hope that helps.
-jon parshall-
Imperial Japanese Navy Homepage
http://www.combinedfleet.com
 
Re: Japanese CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Jon Parshall <mailto:jonp@combinedfleet.com?subject=Re: Japanese CAP at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 4:01 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Japanese CAP at Midway (Grant Goodale)
 
Well, I mean, these guys are trained to destroy enemy aircraft, and when you've got a bunch of sitting ducks in your sights, it's got to be pretty hard to just back off and say, "Nah, screw it." After all, these same planes may be back this afternoon with another torpedo--best to finish them right now, right? Unfortunately, the right answer in the immediate tactical context may not be the right answer in an operational context, and with limited (read: almost nil) ability to communicate and centrally coordinate your air assets, you're essentially relying on the pilots to prioritize and prognosticate accurately while engaged in violent, emotional, physically demanding air combat (even the sitting ducks are shooting back at you, after all). That's pretty tough to do.
 
-jon parshall-
Imperial Japanese Navy Homepage
http://www.combinedfleet.com
 
Re: Japanese CAP at Midway - The Pilots
 
Posted By: Jim Broshot
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 10:21 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Japanese CAP at Midway (Jon Parshall)
 
Just as a matter of curiosity, which IJN fighter pilots drew CAP duty? The best, the least-experienced, luck of the draw?
Thanks!
 
Re: Japanese CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Grant Goodale <mailto:grant.goodale@sympatico.ca?subject=Re: Japanese CAP at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 5:38 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Japanese CAP at Midway (Jon Parshall)
 
Jon -
I was thinking of the 3-4-5 rule as standing orders. I guess that, with so many attacking torpedo planes, a Tally-Ho situation would only be normal. But good combat discipline would have left the 5,000 meter group on station at altitude.
Just my guess, though.
 
FWIW
Grant
 
Re: Japanese CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Cesare <mailto:cesaspe@tin.it?subject=Re: Japanese CAP at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 3:04 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Japanese CAP at Midway (Jon Parshall)
 
Does anybody know the aproximate distance the japanese carriers had each other at the moment of the fatal bombing by SBD? In particular, how far was Hiryu and why wasn't she elected for a bombing?
Thanks in advance
Cesare
 
Re: Japanese CAP at Midway
 
Posted By: Jon Parshall <mailto:jonp@combinedfleet.com?subject=Re: Japanese CAP at Midway>
Date: Tuesday, 25 September 2001, at 3:35 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Japanese CAP at Midway (Cesare)
 
Well, as you might imagine, that is a very important question that we are trying to answer in the course of the research for the book. And there isn't any really hard data along the lines of "At moment X, Kaga was exactly at 45 degrees off our port bow at 7,350 yards on course Y speed Z". What you're left with is using the Nagumo Report and trying to coax out of it where these ships were. We (meaning mostly Tony Tully, really) have also been making headway by using other Japanese sources (survivor's accounts) to get an idea of relative bearings and distances from each other. We've also been searching the photographic record to get an idea of how ships look at various distances, so that when some guy from Soryu says that Kaga was almost hull down at Time X, what does that really translate to in terms of meters distance? So the process has been one of sifting through lots of little tidbits and inferences and amalgamating them with what we know about the Japanese formation in general.
 
At this point we've roughed out a preliminary model of the relative dispositions of the carriers at 1020, and are working on refining it. But I can't really share it at this point, I'm afraid. Big surprise: it differs from the conventional record in a couple of respects.
Sorry to be a tease
 
-jon parshall-
Imperial Japanese Navy Homepage
http://www.combinedfleet.com
 
Posted By: Emmanuel <mailto:aecastro1@aol.com?subject=Question about the Aleutian Strike>
Date: Monday, 1 July 2002, at 9:48 p.m.
 
Hello,
How many planes did the light carriers RYUJO and JUNYO launched for the attack on Dutch Harbor (June 3, 1942)?
How many A6M, D3A, or B5N did the Japanese lost?
I read a document about this operation. According to the document, RYUJO squadron launched B5N and A6M
JUNYO squadron launched D3A and A6M It doesn't indicate the number of planes launched and lost.
Thanks for the help.
 
Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike
 
Posted By: Allan <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike>
Date: Monday, 1 July 2002, at 10:40 p.m.
 
In Response To: Question about the Aleutian Strike (Emmanuel)
 
I have 4 sources, and each one is different from the others, however, I can only conclude that this one might be closer to the truth. It comes from Interrogation NAV 20 of USSBS #97.
The First Strike consisted of the following:
Ryujo - 6/A6M2 - 9/B5N1/2 of which one B5N was an operational casualty
Junyo - 9/A6M2 - 12/D3A1 of which this portion aborted due to weather.
The Second Strike consisted of the following:
Ryujo - 3/A6M2 - 6/B5N1/2 of which one A6M2 was lost to combat.
Junyo - 6/A6M2 - 6/D3A1 of which two D3A1 were lost, one ditched and crew not recovered and one written off.
Cruisers lost two of four E8N2, and the other two were so badly damaged to combat, they were not retrieved.
 
Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike
 
Posted By: Mike Wenger <mailto:wengerm@mindspring.com?subject=Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike>
Date: Tuesday, 2 July 2002, at 6:52 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike (Allan)
 
Emmanuel/Allan
The Aleutians situation on 3 June is VERY confusing owing to multiple/split strikes and aborted missions. Note that the following does NOT address the 4 June situation.
RYUJO launched 2 deckloads of 10 aircraft within a span of a very few minutes:
3 VF - combat air patrol
7 VT - 1st attack unit
-----------------------------
3 VF - escort (I think)
7 VT - 2nd attack unit - 2 aircraft ditched, crews saved
These two VT units attacked Dutch Harbor separately, but at about the same time
=================
JUNYO launched a strike at about the same time as the RYUJO launch.
13 VF - escort
15 VB - 3rd attack unit - aborted in mid-flight due to weather
Later in the morning JUNYO launched another strike, unconnected to the large early a.m. raid.
6 VF - escort
15 VB - attack unit - likewise aborted in mid-flight due to weather
SOURCE: Kodochoshos/interviews
 
Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike
 
Posted By: Andrew Obluski <mailto:aoba41@yahoo.com?subject=Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike>
Date: Tuesday, 2 July 2002, at 9:52 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike (Mike Wenger)
 
Hi Mike
I read that RYUJO also launched pre-strike weather recco Kates. Two pairs of them supplied CarDiv 4 HQ with data on the weather conditions over the target. Strangely enough Lt Hiroichi SAMEJIMA [Eta Jima 66; future CofS JSDF] flew one of these missions. Lt Masayuki YAMAGAMI [63] led combat B5N2 over the target.
Andrew
 
Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike
 
Posted By: Mike Wenger <mailto:wengerm@mindspring.com?subject=Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike>
Date: Tuesday, 2 July 2002, at 10:26 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike (Andrew Obluski)
 
Andrew,
That is correct. Two small VT sections (2 a/c @) flew recon- one flight in the morning, and one in early afternoon, in preparation for the late afternoon 4 June strike on Dutch Harbor.
Lt. Saneshima Hiroichi led the first and Lt.(jg) Sato Ryozo led the second.
By the way, on another topic, I have no material regarding the cruiser and battleship PH floatplane operations... sorry!
Mike W.
 
Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike
 
Posted By: Andrew Obluski <mailto:aoba41@yahoo.com?subject=Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike>
Date: Wednesday, 3 July 2002, at 5:41 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike (Mike Wenger)
 
Mike I know you did your best. Thanks for your input.
Have more questions on the Aleutians.
Do you know the names of D3A officers [apart from ABE] that were stationed aboard JUNYO during the strike? One source claims that Lt Nobuo Hanada was KIA, but could not verify it. Who led the second kanko strike on 3 June [the first was led by YAMAGAMI]
Best regards
Andrew
 
Re: Mike, I thank you very much!!
 
Posted By: Mike Wenger <mailto:wengerm@mindspring.com?subject=Re: Mike, I thank you very much!!>
Date: Tuesday, 2 July 2002, at 7:38 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: Mike, I thank you very much!! *No Text* (Allan)
 
Allan,
No problem.
There is a tremendous amount of valuable data within the USSBS volumes. However, this particular example reveals the pitfalls of relying on them too heavily for tactical details. One must remember that the Japanese officers interviewed worked in large measure from memory, and certainly did not have the advantage of using their own naval documents. The interviews are much more valuable for providing a window into their strategic thinking, and, for providing a wider view of operations.
 
 
Posted By: James F. Lansdale <mailto:LRAJIM@aol.com?subject='Four Davids, One Goliath!': Part 1 *PIC*>
Date: Saturday, 2 February 2002, at 1:15 p.m.
 
"Four Davids, One Goliath!":The First Air Battle Over Midway
The need to gather aerial intelligence for use by the Imperial Japanese Naval Command resulted in the formulation of the "K Operations" (K Sakusen) in February 1942. K-Sakusen were to be long-range reconnaissance flights over American bases utilizing the Kawanishi H8K1 "Emily" flying boats attached to the Yokohama Kokutai (Yokohama Air Group). Strategically placed I-Class submarines would serve as radio beacons and/or refueling depot ships for the several-thousand-mile missions originating in the Marshall Islands.
 
The first K Sakusen occurred on 4 March 1942. Two Emilys (Y-71, s/n 73, and Y-72, s/n 55) of the Yokohama Kokutai, each respectively captained by Lt. HASHIZUME, Hisao and Ens. SASAO, Shozuke, were to fly from the Marshall Islands, refuel at French Frigate Shoal, reconnoiter and bomb Hawaii, and return non-stop to the Marshalls. Using the submarine I-9 as a radio beacon, the two lumbering Emilys completed their incredible twenty-four hour, 4,000-mile mission safely. The principal importance of this mission, at least to the Americans, was the recognition of the need to secure French Frigate Shoal to prevent its use as a staging area for similar future missions.
 
"Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2 *PIC*
 
Posted By: James F. Lansdale <mailto:LRAJIM@aol.com?subject='Four Davids, One Goliath!': Part 2 *PIC*>
Date: Saturday, 2 February 2002, at 1:25 p.m.
 
The second K Sakusen was flown a few days later*. On 10 March (USDT), HASHIZUME, in [Y-71] was to reconnoiter Midway Island while SASAO was to photograph Johnston Island. Take-off was at 0950 (local) from Wotje. Midway radar picked-up the HASHIZUME Emily [Y-71] at 1037 (local) forty-three miles southwest of the island and a four plane division of Brewster F2A-3 Buffaloes from VMF-221 was scrambled to intercept. Captain James L. NEEFUS flew the lead aircraft and Lts. James McCARTHY and Charles SOMERS and Marine Gunner (NAP) Robert L. DICKEY accompanied him. NEEFUS was the first to attack the Emily by sending a burst into one engine at 10,000 feet. The Emily dove, with one engine smoking, to 3,000 feet. On the way down, McCARTHY, SOMERS, and DICKEY made one pass each on the smoking plane with DICKEY attacking from the rear. Return fire peppered Buffalo [MF-9], BuNo. 01524, and wounded DICKEY in the shoulder. NEEFUS returned to the fray and made a final pass, which resulted in HASHIZUME's Emily crashing to the sea where it continued to burn before sinking. Thus ended the first aerial battle over Midway and the first confirmed kill by a Buffalo flown by an American pilot in World War II, as well as the first loss of an Emily by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN).
That evening Tokyo Rose announced to the elated Marine defenders on Midway that the island had been successfully attacked, but that one of the attacking aircraft had been lost! Lt. HASHIZUME's sacrifice resulted in a posthumous promotion. One further K Sakusen was planned for May, however, alerted to these threats, the U.S. Navy had begun to patrol the waters off French Frigate Shoal, thus ending the K Sakusen and depriving the IJN of important aerial intelligence.
 
*American records list this mission for 10 March 1942 (SHERROD p.53).
Japanese records list the death of Lt. Hashizume in Ikari's "The Last Type 2 Flyingboat", as "approximately 0500 of March 7". But JMSDF RAdm. Hitsuji said in his book, "The Last Flyingboat" that Hashizume was KIA at "approximately 0840 on March 11" (Tokyo DT). Ikari's book was wrriten in 1979 and revised in 1994. On the other hand, Hitsuji's book was written in 1983 and revised in 1988 (according to Katsuhiro Uchida, 3 February 2002 in a posting to J-A DotCom).
N.B. Please click on link below the Buffalo photo for a photograph of Lt. HASHIZUME, IJN via Katsuhiro UCHIDA
*****
Acknowledgements:
My special thanks go to to Jim SAWRUK, Al ALSLEBEN, Andrew OBLUSKI, and Katsuhiro UCHIDA for material, details, and references for this account.
Sources and additional reading:
"Last Man off Wake Island," Bayler and Carnes, Bobbs-Merrill: 1943, p.p.181-200.
"Submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy," Carpenter and Polmar, NIP:1986, p.p.20-21.
"History of Marine Corps Aviation In World War II," Robert Sherrod, Presidio Press:1980, p.53.
 
Re: "Four Davids,...K-Sakusen
 
Posted By: James F. Lansdale <mailto:LRAJIM@aol.com?subject=Re: 'Four Davids,...K-Sakusen>
Date: Saturday, 9 February 2002, at 9:32 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: "Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2 (Steve Horn)
 
Hi again Steve
I now stand very corrected!
I have done some more homework and read "And I Was There," by E.T. LAYTON. According to LAYTON (p.p.372-373), K-Sakusen (K Operations) were so-named after the Japanese code letters for Pearl Harbor [AK].
 
The first K-Sakusen occurred on 4 March 1942 and the second was to have occurred prior to the assault on Midway in late May. Thus, the interception of the Emily near Midway Island on 10 March was NOT one of the K-Sakusen!
This mission was either not coded or it might have been called F-Sakusen (a recon precursor to AF-Sakusen).
 
FWIW
Jim Lansdale
 
Re: "Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2
 
Posted By: Steve Horn <mailto:stevehorn55@hotmail.com?subject=Re: 'Four Davids, One Goliath!': Part 2>
Date: Monday, 4 February 2002, at 12:08 p.m.
 
In Response To: "Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2 *PIC* (James F. Lansdale)
 
Jim, Andrew et al,
I feel a little like David taking on several Goliaths, but I have a couple of questions. Jim, you say that French Frigate Shoals was used for refueling by submarines on the March 10 "K" mission to photograph Midway, but I believe that no refueling was necessary. Y-71 carried more gasoline and no bombs for this photo-recon mission and the round-trip distance (shorter than the flight to Oahu) was well within the range capability of the "Emily" in this configuration. Sasao's flight to Johnston Island was even shorter, so his airplane needed no refueling either.
To my friend Andrew: You mention a refueling of H8Ks off Lisianski Atoll on 30 May. Lisianski was very near Midway and I believe would be under fairly heavy scrutiny from the PBYs operating from Midway at the time. On the second "K" mission to Oahu on 30 May, Necker Island was chosen as the alternate refueling site in case the Americans precluded the use of French Frigate Shoals. The Americans did station seaplane tenders and PBYs at FF Shoals to do just that. For some reason, the Japanese did not revert to their alternate island choice for the armed recon mission scheduled for 30 May, just before Midway. My information came from RADM Hitsuji, who had been a Kokutai commander (851 Ku). I corresponded with the Admiral for several months before his death in 1995. Maybe we can find other sources who can confirm some of these "facts."
TIA, Steve Horn
 
Re: "Four Davids,...K-Sakusen
 
Posted By: Steve Horn <mailto:stevehorn55@hotmail.com?subject=Re: 'Four Davids,...K-Sakusen>
Date: Sunday, 10 February 2002, at 10:59 a.m.
 
In Response To: Re: "Four Davids,...K-Sakusen (James F. Lansdale)
 
Hey Jim,
Thanks for the information. I reviewed "And I Was There" by Layton. I was aware that the March 3/4 1942 Oahu attempt and the later aborted May 30 attempt were given K-Sakusen designations, with "K" designating Hawaii. The Midway mission was strictly photo-recon and the airplane carried more fuel and no bombs, so it could have been coded "F" as you suggested. Bombs were dropped on the first K-Sakusen mission and bombs were scheduled for the second K-Sakusen against Oahu. I'm hoping to gain access to more of the Senso Sosho volumes to get more detail on these flights.
Thanks for your interest.
Steve Horn
 
Re: "Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2
 
Posted By: Steve Horn <mailto:stevehorn55@hotmail.com?subject=Re: 'Four Davids, One Goliath!': Part 2>
Date: Wednesday, 6 February 2002, at 8:32 p.m.
 
In Response To: Re: "Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2 (James F. Lansdale)
 
Hi Jim,
My sources were an article published by RADM Tsuneo Hitsuji, "Reflections of the Great Skies", translated for me by David and Harumi Ziegler (Tokyo: Anzen Zeppo, no date); another article from Admiral Hitsuji called "The Complete Story of Operation K" from his book, "The Last Flying Boat," translated for me by Mikio Aida and a letter from the Admiral telling of Lt. Hashizume's complete life history. Four Combat Reports from the USMC "Buffalo" pilots, plus a summation of the action report by the L/Col. Wallace, the VMF-221 Squadron Commander establish the date of 10 March 1942 (which would be 11 March Tokyo time.) The mission was originally scheduled for 7 March, but the crews were exhausted from their Oahu bombing attempt and the airplanes needed maintenance, so Tokyo rescheduled the photo recon missions for the 10th.
Robert Sherrod's "History of Marine Corp Aviation" describes the shootdown, as does the very good "A Glorious Day in Our History" by a group of contributors including our own Mark Horan. I plan to include the story of the shootdown in my book (work in progress!) Thanks for your comments about the incident. More details keep surfacing, but I'm afraid that the best stuff came from the late Admiral.
Steve Horn
 
"Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 3 by Mark HORAN *PIC*
 
Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject='Four Davids, One Goliath!': Part 3 by Mark HORAN *PIC*>
Date: Saturday, 2 February 2002, at 3:47 p.m.
 
In Response To: "Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2 *PIC* (James F. Lansdale)
 
Jim, et al;
The book I co-authored, "A Glorious Page in Our History, The Battle of Midway" contains many additional details on this interception on pages 26-27.
Initial RADAR contact was at 1037, and reported a target bearing 260 degrees, distance 43 miles. One minute later the air alert was sounded and, per standing orders, all operational MAD [Marine Aviation Detachment) aircraft, 13 F2A-3s and 15 SB2U-3s cleared the field, the last by 1045. VMF-221 split into two patrols, high CAP and low CAP while VMSB-231 stood clear in a position bearing 100 degrees, distant 20 miles.
By 1039 Lieutenant-Colonel William J. Wallace, USMC had arrived in the MAD CP and directed VMF-221 to hold a position bearing 280, distant 20 miles and await developments. The bogey, while intially spotted 43 miles out, had changed bearing and range several times, moving off to a distance of 73 miles at one point. However, by 1101 the contact was 50 miles out and closing on a bearing of 200-285 at an estimated 7,000 feet.
At that time, Wallace vectored a four-plane division, under VMF-221s executive officer, organized thus:
 
First Section:
221-MF-1, Bu.No. 01537, Captain James L. Neefus, USMC
221-MF-12, Bu.No. 01542, Second Lieutenant Capt. Francis Paul McCarthy, USMC
 
Second Section:
221-MF-4, Bo.No. 01548, First Lieutenant Charles W. Somers, USMC
221-MF-9, Bu.No. 01524, Marine Gunner (NAP) Robert L. Dickey, USMC
At 1110 Neefus sighted the bogey five miles away at 9,000 feet and radioed "Tallyho!".
 
As the Marines closed, the bandit turned to starboard and showed her tail feathers to the Americans. The F2As, now at full-power and in high blower were just able to continue closing, and finally the big flying boat pushed over into a high-speed 30 degree dive, at which point Neefus initiated a high-side attack, followed by his wingman, McCarthy, and the second section leader, Somers. Dickey, however, having become separated from Somers as his plane could not get up as much speed, made his run in from astaern.
 
Dickey's aircraft was hit by seven 7.7 mm rounds. One passed through the tail wheel bearing, three simply passed through the Buffalos skin, one passed through the engine's number seven cylinder, one punctured the firewall between two cylinders, and the last passed through the left side panel of the windshield and hit Dickey's left arm, breaking it above the elbow. With neither "movement or sensation" in his left arm, Dickey put MF-9 into a diving turn for home, pulling out at 500 feet.
 
At 1125 Neefus radioed Midway that the enemy was buring on the water. Three minutes later Dickey radioed that he was returning to base. At 1142 Neefus radioed that the his three remaining planes had reformed and were returning. At 1148, Dickey radioed in that hae was "five miles out and coming in direct", something he managed to do successfully despite his inability to use his throttle-hand.
 
Major Wallace recommended Neeefus for the Navy Cross and Somers, McCarthy, and Dickey for the DFC. He also presented the foursome with a bottle of bourbon for their victory.
 
The book contains, on page 28, a photo of the pilots of VMF-221 taken circa 1 February 1942 which shows all four of the victorious pilots. On page 29 there is a photo of the wounded Dickey receiving his DFC from Rear-Admiral Wilhelm L. Friedell, USN at Mare Island Naval Hospital on 16 May 1942, while on page 30 there are photographs of Neefus receiving his Navy Cross and McCarthy his DFC, both presented by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN during his visit to Midway on 2 May 1942. Unfortunately, McCarthy had just over one month of life left - Capt. McCarthy was to be shot down and killed over Midway on 4 June while flying F4F-3 Bu.No. 4006, coded MF-26.
None of the other three pilots would fight in June. The wounded Dickey was flown to Pearl Harbor and then shipped stateside to recover. Both Neefus and Somers were rotated out of VMF-221 shortly after Nimitz's visit.
 
Credit: "A Glorious Page In Our History," Mark Horan et al, Pictorial Histories Pub: 1990, p.30.
 
 
Posted By: Wayne McMullan <mailto:mcmullan@alltel.net?subject=Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes>
Date: Friday, 18 January 2002, at 6:33 p.m.
 
I believe that I saw a message recently discussing whether the Soryu and Hiryu had change their id bands prior to Midway. I believe the conclusion was that they would not have repainted the aircraft in the short space of time. Is it possible that the aircraft cross decked? Comparing names I have noted several Soryu Kate crewmen at Pearl Harbor who are flying in Kates at Midway.
 
Re: Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes *PIC*
 
Posted By: James F. Lansdale <mailto:LRAJIM@aol.com?subject=Re: Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes *PIC*>
Date: Saturday, 19 January 2002, at 5:37 a.m.
 
In Response To: Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes (Wayne McMullan)
 
Hi Wayne
One of the foremost and respected Kido Butai researchers, Michael WENGER, wrote on this MB:
"BI-181 was assigned to Lieut. Suganami Masaji, Soryu fighter group leader during the Battle of Midway. [SOURCE - Soryu Detailed Action Report, Battle of Midway, page 53, NHC Microfilm Reel JD-1]."
Here is documented evidence that the SORYU and HIRYU retained their Pearl Harbor era assigned codes as late as the Midway Battle.
When IJNAF carrier air groups trained, they did so as an integrated unit organized for service as two kokubokan hikokitai (CAGs). One air unit would be assigned to one carrier of a koku sentai and the other was assigned to the second carrier (in this case the No.2 Koku Sentai, which then consisted of the SORYU and HIRYU).
SORYU received the No.1 Hiko Daitai with the code [BI-xxx] and single blue fuselage band (as a tactical recognition emblem). HIRYU boarded the No.2 Hiko Daitai whose aircraft received the code [BII-xxx] and carried a double blue fuselage band for tactical recognition.
Some still contend that, since the No.2 Koku Sentai CO's flag was transferred from SORYU to the HIRYU in May/June 1942, either the air crews and aircraft switched carriers (which did not occur, according to the records) OR the deck crews repainted all the aircraft with new codes and fuselage bands (highly unlikely).
Transferring the flag was a formality carried out for the convenience and at the prerogative of the CO. To have switched aircraft or crews would have been disruptive to the command. And, to have repainted all the aircraft with new markings would not have been expediant.
Michael WENGER's quote above should help to settle this long-lasting markings debate.
Jim Lansdale
 
Re: Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes
 
Posted By: Mike Wenger <mailto:wengerm@mindspring.com?subject=Re: Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes>
Date: Friday, 18 January 2002, at 9:59 p.m.
 
In Response To: Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes (Wayne McMullan)
 
Wayne,
Soryu's air group underwent reorganization post-Indian Ocean, but in the Midway Strike there were still 75% Pearl Harbor vets flying that day, to wit...
12 of 18 pilots.
14 of 18 observers.
15 of 18 radiomen.
[Sources - Hawai Sakusen, Soryu DAR-Midway]
There are likely a number of the PH non-matches that were in her air group early on, but were simply spares during PH, which would mean a higher percentage of veterans from the Pearl Harbor period. I do have her records for the Wake operations. I will see how many of the PH non-matches are included in the Wake strikes. Give me a couple of days. Matching all this handwritten Japanese is not easy at all.
I have often thought that the references to "less experienced aircrews" at Midway were baloney. 75-80% vets from previous operations was VERY HIGH in my opinion.
I would have to see the proof, vis-a-vis the changed fuselage bands. Even from a Japanese vet, this has the ring of a "sea story"... but I have certainly been wrong before.
Regards,
Mike Wenger
Raleigh, NC
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