Midway aircraft

Question about the Aleutian Strike

Posted By: Emmanuel <mailto:aecastro1@aol.com?subject=Question about the Aleutian Strike> Date: Monday, 1 July 2002, at 9:48 p.m.

Hello,
How many planes did the light carriers RYUJO and JUNYO launched for the attack on Dutch Harbor (June 3, 1942)? How many A6M, D3A, or B5N did the Japanese lost?
I read a document about this operation. According to the document, RYUJO squadron launched B5N and A6M JUNYO squadron launched D3A and A6M It doesn't indicate the number of planes launched and lost.
Thanks for the help.

Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike

Posted By: Allan <mailto:Wildcat42@AOL.com?subject=Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike> Date: Monday, 1 July 2002, at 10:40 p.m.

In Response To: Question about the Aleutian Strike (Emmanuel)

I have 4 sources, and each one is different from the others, however, I can only conclude that this one might be closer to the truth. It comes from Interrogation NAV 20 of USSBS #97.
The First Strike consisted of the following: Ryujo - 6/A6M2 - 9/B5N1/2 of which one B5N was an operational casualty Junyo - 9/A6M2 - 12/D3A1 of which this portion aborted due to weather.
The Second Strike consisted of the following: Ryujo - 3/A6M2 - 6/B5N1/2 of which one A6M2 was lost to combat. Junyo - 6/A6M2 - 6/D3A1 of which two D3A1 were lost, one ditched and crew not recovered and one written off. Cruisers lost two of four E8N2, and the other two were so badly damaged to combat, they were not retrieved.

Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike

Posted By: Mike Wenger <mailto:wengerm@mindspring.com?subject=Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike> Date: Tuesday, 2 July 2002, at 6:52 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike (Allan)

Emmanuel/Allan
The Aleutians situation on 3 June is VERY confusing owing to multiple/split strikes and aborted missions. Note that the following does NOT address the 4 June situation.
RYUJO launched 2 deckloads of 10 aircraft within a span of a very few minutes:
3 VF - combat air patrol 7 VT - 1st attack unit ----------------------------- 3 VF - escort (I think) 7 VT - 2nd attack unit - 2 aircraft ditched, crews saved
These two VT units attacked Dutch Harbor separately, but at about the same time =================
JUNYO launched a strike at about the same time as the RYUJO launch.
13 VF - escort 15 VB - 3rd attack unit - aborted in mid-flight due to weather
Later in the morning JUNYO launched another strike, unconnected to the large early a.m. raid.
6 VF - escort 15 VB - attack unit - likewise aborted in mid-flight due to weather
SOURCE: Kodochoshos/interviews

Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike

Posted By: Andrew Obluski <mailto:aoba41@yahoo.com?subject=Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike> Date: Tuesday, 2 July 2002, at 9:52 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike (Mike Wenger)

Hi Mike
I read that RYUJO also launched pre-strike weather recco Kates. Two pairs of them supplied CarDiv 4 HQ with data on the weather conditions over the target. Strangely enough Lt Hiroichi SAMEJIMA [Eta Jima 66; future CofS JSDF] flew one of these missions. Lt Masayuki YAMAGAMI [63] led combat B5N2 over the target.
Andrew

Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike

Posted By: Mike Wenger <mailto:wengerm@mindspring.com?subject=Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike> Date: Tuesday, 2 July 2002, at 10:26 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike (Andrew Obluski)

Andrew,
That is correct. Two small VT sections (2 a/c @) flew recon- one flight in the morning, and one in early afternoon, in preparation for the late afternoon 4 June strike on Dutch Harbor.
Lt. Saneshima Hiroichi led the first and Lt.(jg) Sato Ryozo led the second.
By the way, on another topic, I have no material regarding the cruiser and battleship PH floatplane operations... sorry!
Mike W.

Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike

Posted By: Andrew Obluski <mailto:aoba41@yahoo.com?subject=Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike> Date: Wednesday, 3 July 2002, at 5:41 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Question about the Aleutian Strike (Mike Wenger)

Mike I know you did your best. Thanks for your input.
Have more questions on the Aleutians.
Do you know the names of D3A officers [apart from ABE] that were stationed aboard JUNYO during the strike? One source claims that Lt Nobuo Hanada was KIA, but could not verify it. Who led the second kanko strike on 3 June [the first was led by YAMAGAMI]
Best regards Andrew

Re: Mike, I thank you very much!!

Posted By: Mike Wenger <mailto:wengerm@mindspring.com?subject=Re: Mike, I thank you very much!!> Date: Tuesday, 2 July 2002, at 7:38 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Mike, I thank you very much!! *No Text* (Allan)

Allan,
No problem.
There is a tremendous amount of valuable data within the USSBS volumes. However, this particular example reveals the pitfalls of relying on them too heavily for tactical details. One must remember that the Japanese officers interviewed worked in large measure from memory, and certainly did not have the advantage of using their own naval documents. The interviews are much more valuable for providing a window into their strategic thinking, and, for providing a wider view of operations.

"Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 1 *PIC*

Posted By: James F. Lansdale <mailto:LRAJIM@aol.com?subject='Four Davids, One Goliath!': Part 1 *PIC*> Date: Saturday, 2 February 2002, at 1:15 p.m.

"Four Davids, One Goliath!":The First Air Battle Over Midway
The need to gather aerial intelligence for use by the Imperial Japanese Naval Command resulted in the formulation of the "K Operations" (K Sakusen) in February 1942. K-Sakusen were to be long-range reconnaissance flights over American bases utilizing the Kawanishi H8K1 "Emily" flying boats attached to the Yokohama Kokutai (Yokohama Air Group). Strategically placed I-Class submarines would serve as radio beacons and/or refueling depot ships for the several-thousand-mile missions originating in the Marshall Islands.

The first K Sakusen occurred on 4 March 1942. Two Emilys (Y-71, s/n 73, and Y-72, s/n 55) of the Yokohama Kokutai, each respectively captained by Lt. HASHIZUME, Hisao and Ens. SASAO, Shozuke, were to fly from the Marshall Islands, refuel at French Frigate Shoal, reconnoiter and bomb Hawaii, and return non-stop to the Marshalls. Using the submarine I-9 as a radio beacon, the two lumbering Emilys completed their incredible twenty-four hour, 4,000-mile mission safely. The principal importance of this mission, at least to the Americans, was the recognition of the need to secure French Frigate Shoal to prevent its use as a staging area for similar future missions.

"Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2 *PIC*

Posted By: James F. Lansdale <mailto:LRAJIM@aol.com?subject='Four Davids, One Goliath!': Part 2 *PIC*> Date: Saturday, 2 February 2002, at 1:25 p.m.

The second K Sakusen was flown a few days later*. On 10 March (USDT), HASHIZUME, in [Y-71] was to reconnoiter Midway Island while SASAO was to photograph Johnston Island. Take-off was at 0950 (local) from Wotje. Midway radar picked-up the HASHIZUME Emily [Y-71] at 1037 (local) forty-three miles southwest of the island and a four plane division of Brewster F2A-3 Buffaloes from VMF-221 was scrambled to intercept. Captain James L. NEEFUS flew the lead aircraft and Lts. James McCARTHY and Charles SOMERS and Marine Gunner (NAP) Robert L. DICKEY accompanied him. NEEFUS was the first to attack the Emily by sending a burst into one engine at 10,000 feet. The Emily dove, with one engine smoking, to 3,000 feet. On the way down, McCARTHY, SOMERS, and DICKEY made one pass each on the smoking plane with DICKEY attacking from the rear. Return fire peppered Buffalo [MF-9], BuNo. 01524, and wounded DICKEY in the shoulder. NEEFUS returned to the fray and made a final pass, which resulted in HASHIZUME's Emily crashing to the sea where it continued to burn before sinking. Thus ended the first aerial battle over Midway and the first confirmed kill by a Buffalo flown by an American pilot in World War II, as well as the first loss of an Emily by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN).
That evening Tokyo Rose announced to the elated Marine defenders on Midway that the island had been successfully attacked, but that one of the attacking aircraft had been lost! Lt. HASHIZUME's sacrifice resulted in a posthumous promotion. One further K Sakusen was planned for May, however, alerted to these threats, the U.S. Navy had begun to patrol the waters off French Frigate Shoal, thus ending the K Sakusen and depriving the IJN of important aerial intelligence.

*American records list this mission for 10 March 1942 (SHERROD p.53).
Japanese records list the death of Lt. Hashizume in Ikari's "The Last Type 2 Flyingboat", as "approximately 0500 of March 7". But JMSDF RAdm. Hitsuji said in his book, "The Last Flyingboat" that Hashizume was KIA at "approximately 0840 on March 11" (Tokyo DT). Ikari's book was wrriten in 1979 and revised in 1994. On the other hand, Hitsuji's book was written in 1983 and revised in 1988 (according to Katsuhiro Uchida, 3 February 2002 in a posting to J-A DotCom).
N.B. Please click on link below the Buffalo photo for a photograph of Lt. HASHIZUME, IJN via Katsuhiro UCHIDA
*****
Acknowledgements:
My special thanks go to to Jim SAWRUK, Al ALSLEBEN, Andrew OBLUSKI, and Katsuhiro UCHIDA for material, details, and references for this account.
Sources and additional reading:
"Last Man off Wake Island," Bayler and Carnes, Bobbs-Merrill: 1943, p.p.181-200.
"Submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy," Carpenter and Polmar, NIP:1986, p.p.20-21.
"History of Marine Corps Aviation In World War II," Robert Sherrod, Presidio Press:1980, p.53.

Re: "Four Davids,...K-Sakusen

Posted By: James F. Lansdale <mailto:LRAJIM@aol.com?subject=Re: 'Four Davids,...K-Sakusen> Date: Saturday, 9 February 2002, at 9:32 p.m.

In Response To: Re: "Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2 (Steve Horn)

Hi again Steve
I now stand very corrected!
I have done some more homework and read "And I Was There," by E.T. LAYTON. According to LAYTON (p.p.372-373), K-Sakusen (K Operations) were so-named after the Japanese code letters for Pearl Harbor [AK].

The first K-Sakusen occurred on 4 March 1942 and the second was to have occurred prior to the assault on Midway in late May. Thus, the interception of the Emily near Midway Island on 10 March was NOT one of the K-Sakusen!
This mission was either not coded or it might have been called F-Sakusen (a recon precursor to AF-Sakusen).

FWIW
Jim Lansdale

Re: "Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2

Posted By: Steve Horn <mailto:stevehorn55@hotmail.com?subject=Re: 'Four Davids, One Goliath!': Part 2> Date: Monday, 4 February 2002, at 12:08 p.m.

In Response To: "Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2 *PIC* (James F. Lansdale)

Jim, Andrew et al, I feel a little like David taking on several Goliaths, but I have a couple of questions. Jim, you say that French Frigate Shoals was used for refueling by submarines on the March 10 "K" mission to photograph Midway, but I believe that no refueling was necessary. Y-71 carried more gasoline and no bombs for this photo-recon mission and the round-trip distance (shorter than the flight to Oahu) was well within the range capability of the "Emily" in this configuration. Sasao's flight to Johnston Island was even shorter, so his airplane needed no refueling either.
To my friend Andrew: You mention a refueling of H8Ks off Lisianski Atoll on 30 May. Lisianski was very near Midway and I believe would be under fairly heavy scrutiny from the PBYs operating from Midway at the time. On the second "K" mission to Oahu on 30 May, Necker Island was chosen as the alternate refueling site in case the Americans precluded the use of French Frigate Shoals. The Americans did station seaplane tenders and PBYs at FF Shoals to do just that. For some reason, the Japanese did not revert to their alternate island choice for the armed recon mission scheduled for 30 May, just before Midway. My information came from RADM Hitsuji, who had been a Kokutai commander (851 Ku). I corresponded with the Admiral for several months before his death in 1995. Maybe we can find other sources who can confirm some of these "facts."
TIA, Steve Horn

Re: "Four Davids,...K-Sakusen

Posted By: Steve Horn <mailto:stevehorn55@hotmail.com?subject=Re: 'Four Davids,...K-Sakusen> Date: Sunday, 10 February 2002, at 10:59 a.m.

In Response To: Re: "Four Davids,...K-Sakusen (James F. Lansdale)

Hey Jim, Thanks for the information. I reviewed "And I Was There" by Layton. I was aware that the March 3/4 1942 Oahu attempt and the later aborted May 30 attempt were given K-Sakusen designations, with "K" designating Hawaii. The Midway mission was strictly photo-recon and the airplane carried more fuel and no bombs, so it could have been coded "F" as you suggested. Bombs were dropped on the first K-Sakusen mission and bombs were scheduled for the second K-Sakusen against Oahu. I'm hoping to gain access to more of the Senso Sosho volumes to get more detail on these flights.
Thanks for your interest. Steve Horn

Re: "Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2

Posted By: Steve Horn <mailto:stevehorn55@hotmail.com?subject=Re: 'Four Davids, One Goliath!': Part 2> Date: Wednesday, 6 February 2002, at 8:32 p.m.

In Response To: Re: "Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2 (James F. Lansdale)

Hi Jim, My sources were an article published by RADM Tsuneo Hitsuji, "Reflections of the Great Skies", translated for me by David and Harumi Ziegler (Tokyo: Anzen Zeppo, no date); another article from Admiral Hitsuji called "The Complete Story of Operation K" from his book, "The Last Flying Boat," translated for me by Mikio Aida and a letter from the Admiral telling of Lt. Hashizume's complete life history. Four Combat Reports from the USMC "Buffalo" pilots, plus a summation of the action report by the L/Col. Wallace, the VMF-221 Squadron Commander establish the date of 10 March 1942 (which would be 11 March Tokyo time.) The mission was originally scheduled for 7 March, but the crews were exhausted from their Oahu bombing attempt and the airplanes needed maintenance, so Tokyo rescheduled the photo recon missions for the 10th.
Robert Sherrod's "History of Marine Corp Aviation" describes the shootdown, as does the very good "A Glorious Day in Our History" by a group of contributors including our own Mark Horan. I plan to include the story of the shootdown in my book (work in progress!) Thanks for your comments about the incident. More details keep surfacing, but I'm afraid that the best stuff came from the late Admiral. Steve Horn

"Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 3 by Mark HORAN *PIC*

Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mailto:mhoran@snet.net?subject='Four Davids, One Goliath!': Part 3 by Mark HORAN *PIC*> Date: Saturday, 2 February 2002, at 3:47 p.m.

In Response To: "Four Davids, One Goliath!": Part 2 *PIC* (James F. Lansdale)

Jim, et al;
The book I co-authored, "A Glorious Page in Our History, The Battle of Midway" contains many additional details on this interception on pages 26-27.
Initial RADAR contact was at 1037, and reported a target bearing 260 degrees, distance 43 miles. One minute later the air alert was sounded and, per standing orders, all operational MAD [Marine Aviation Detachment) aircraft, 13 F2A-3s and 15 SB2U-3s cleared the field, the last by 1045. VMF-221 split into two patrols, high CAP and low CAP while VMSB-231 stood clear in a position bearing 100 degrees, distant 20 miles.
By 1039 Lieutenant-Colonel William J. Wallace, USMC had arrived in the MAD CP and directed VMF-221 to hold a position bearing 280, distant 20 miles and await developments. The bogey, while intially spotted 43 miles out, had changed bearing and range several times, moving off to a distance of 73 miles at one point. However, by 1101 the contact was 50 miles out and closing on a bearing of 200-285 at an estimated 7,000 feet.
At that time, Wallace vectored a four-plane division, under VMF-221s executive officer, organized thus:

First Section: 221-MF-1, Bu.No. 01537, Captain James L. Neefus, USMC 221-MF-12, Bu.No. 01542, Second Lieutenant Capt. Francis Paul McCarthy, USMC

Second Section: 221-MF-4, Bo.No. 01548, First Lieutenant Charles W. Somers, USMC 221-MF-9, Bu.No. 01524, Marine Gunner (NAP) Robert L. Dickey, USMC
At 1110 Neefus sighted the bogey five miles away at 9,000 feet and radioed "Tallyho!".

As the Marines closed, the bandit turned to starboard and showed her tail feathers to the Americans. The F2As, now at full-power and in high blower were just able to continue closing, and finally the big flying boat pushed over into a high-speed 30 degree dive, at which point Neefus initiated a high-side attack, followed by his wingman, McCarthy, and the second section leader, Somers. Dickey, however, having become separated from Somers as his plane could not get up as much speed, made his run in from astaern.

Dickey's aircraft was hit by seven 7.7 mm rounds. One passed through the tail wheel bearing, three simply passed through the Buffalos skin, one passed through the engine's number seven cylinder, one punctured the firewall between two cylinders, and the last passed through the left side panel of the windshield and hit Dickey's left arm, breaking it above the elbow. With neither "movement or sensation" in his left arm, Dickey put MF-9 into a diving turn for home, pulling out at 500 feet.

At 1125 Neefus radioed Midway that the enemy was buring on the water. Three minutes later Dickey radioed that he was returning to base. At 1142 Neefus radioed that the his three remaining planes had reformed and were returning. At 1148, Dickey radioed in that hae was "five miles out and coming in direct", something he managed to do successfully despite his inability to use his throttle-hand.

Major Wallace recommended Neeefus for the Navy Cross and Somers, McCarthy, and Dickey for the DFC. He also presented the foursome with a bottle of bourbon for their victory.

The book contains, on page 28, a photo of the pilots of VMF-221 taken circa 1 February 1942 which shows all four of the victorious pilots. On page 29 there is a photo of the wounded Dickey receiving his DFC from Rear-Admiral Wilhelm L. Friedell, USN at Mare Island Naval Hospital on 16 May 1942, while on page 30 there are photographs of Neefus receiving his Navy Cross and McCarthy his DFC, both presented by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN during his visit to Midway on 2 May 1942. Unfortunately, McCarthy had just over one month of life left - Capt. McCarthy was to be shot down and killed over Midway on 4 June while flying F4F-3 Bu.No. 4006, coded MF-26.
None of the other three pilots would fight in June. The wounded Dickey was flown to Pearl Harbor and then shipped stateside to recover. Both Neefus and Somers were rotated out of VMF-221 shortly after Nimitz's visit.

Credit: "A Glorious Page In Our History," Mark Horan et al, Pictorial Histories Pub: 1990, p.30.

Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes

Posted By: Wayne McMullan <mailto:mcmullan@alltel.net?subject=Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes> Date: Friday, 18 January 2002, at 6:33 p.m.

I believe that I saw a message recently discussing whether the Soryu and Hiryu had change their id bands prior to Midway. I believe the conclusion was that they would not have repainted the aircraft in the short space of time. Is it possible that the aircraft cross decked? Comparing names I have noted several Soryu Kate crewmen at Pearl Harbor who are flying in Kates at Midway.

Re: Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes *PIC*

Posted By: James F. Lansdale <mailto:LRAJIM@aol.com?subject=Re: Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes *PIC*> Date: Saturday, 19 January 2002, at 5:37 a.m.

In Response To: Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes (Wayne McMullan)

Hi Wayne
One of the foremost and respected Kido Butai researchers, Michael WENGER, wrote on this MB:
"BI-181 was assigned to Lieut. Suganami Masaji, Soryu fighter group leader during the Battle of Midway. [SOURCE - Soryu Detailed Action Report, Battle of Midway, page 53, NHC Microfilm Reel JD-1]."
Here is documented evidence that the SORYU and HIRYU retained their Pearl Harbor era assigned codes as late as the Midway Battle.
When IJNAF carrier air groups trained, they did so as an integrated unit organized for service as two kokubokan hikokitai (CAGs). One air unit would be assigned to one carrier of a koku sentai and the other was assigned to the second carrier (in this case the No.2 Koku Sentai, which then consisted of the SORYU and HIRYU).
SORYU received the No.1 Hiko Daitai with the code [BI-xxx] and single blue fuselage band (as a tactical recognition emblem). HIRYU boarded the No.2 Hiko Daitai whose aircraft received the code [BII-xxx] and carried a double blue fuselage band for tactical recognition.
Some still contend that, since the No.2 Koku Sentai CO's flag was transferred from SORYU to the HIRYU in May/June 1942, either the air crews and aircraft switched carriers (which did not occur, according to the records) OR the deck crews repainted all the aircraft with new codes and fuselage bands (highly unlikely).
Transferring the flag was a formality carried out for the convenience and at the prerogative of the CO. To have switched aircraft or crews would have been disruptive to the command. And, to have repainted all the aircraft with new markings would not have been expediant.
Michael WENGER's quote above should help to settle this long-lasting markings debate.
Jim Lansdale

Re: Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes

Posted By: Mike Wenger <mailto:wengerm@mindspring.com?subject=Re: Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes> Date: Friday, 18 January 2002, at 9:59 p.m.

In Response To: Midway 2nd Division Carrier Codes (Wayne McMullan)

Wayne,
Soryu's air group underwent reorganization post-Indian Ocean, but in the Midway Strike there were still 75% Pearl Harbor vets flying that day, to wit...
12 of 18 pilots. 14 of 18 observers. 15 of 18 radiomen. [Sources - Hawai Sakusen, Soryu DAR-Midway]
There are likely a number of the PH non-matches that were in her air group early on, but were simply spares during PH, which would mean a higher percentage of veterans from the Pearl Harbor period. I do have her records for the Wake operations. I will see how many of the PH non-matches are included in the Wake strikes. Give me a couple of days. Matching all this handwritten Japanese is not easy at all.
I have often thought that the references to "less experienced aircrews" at Midway were baloney. 75-80% vets from previous operations was VERY HIGH in my opinion.
I would have to see the proof, vis-a-vis the changed fuselage bands. Even from a Japanese vet, this has the ring of a "sea story"... but I have certainly been wrong before.
Regards,
Mike Wenger Raleigh, NC